Unfortunately Romania proves to be one of the slow learners and the way it is handling the Schengen accession issue is a very good illustration. After France and Germany made it clear that they would rather see Romania’s and Bulgaria’s accession postponed to a later date when the two countries will be better prepared, bringing as the strongest argument their still very corrupt justice system, Romania decided to take a strong position. That would be all perfectly justifiable, especially given the fact that technically, it is ready to join the Schengen area, if only Romanian politicians had benefited from the socialisation process in the last four years and had learned how to properly use the rules of the game in their favour. Instead, the messages Romania has been sending in the last days come across as desperate childish attempts to threaten the EU with blocking ongoing processes such as Croatia’s accession (on the pretext that any future Member States should also have a Co-operation and Verification Mechanism (CVM), like Romania and Bulgaria do) and the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty amendment allowing for the new 18 MEPs to take their seats in the European Parliament. What Romania is naively trying to achieve with this is to “hurt” France and Germany (although it is Spain that benefits the most from the additional MEPs), but such statements and, even worse, actions fit much better in a kindergarten than in the EU arena.

What Romania is proving in the last days is that:

1. it has not learned anything in the last four years about how the EU really functions, what are the main institutional players, what is the balance of power and how can one best influence the decision-making process; and here I mostly refer to the informal mechanisms, the things one learns by doing, the product of the so called “socialisation process”, although I still have doubts about how clear the formal mechanisms are to Romanian politicians, and the latest developments are only reinforcing these doubts;
2. it lacks a coherent strategy to reach the goal of Schengen accession; after the EU accession process was completed, the various political forces in Romania have not been able to work together to create a constructive position for Romania to assume at the EU level; instead, contradictory messages from Romanian officials kept reaching Brussels, each one defending its domestic political position, without even realising the harm they do to Romania’s image and interest. In a sense, one can say that all these inconsistencies and the lack of a clear official stance fueled the arguments against the March 2011 accession. Romania has thus shot itself in the foot, thanks to the messy internal political scene but also to the ignorance (and lack of interest) regarding the functioning of the EU and the role Romania can and should be playing in it;
3. its officials lack tact and diplomatic skills; not that this is any news, but this situations proves once more the inability of Romanian politicians and diplomats to, first of all, prevent such incidents from occurring and, secondly, once they’ve occurred, to try to suggest reasonable solutions or at the very least (and I am really lowering my expectations here!) refrain from making ridiculous statements. Not only was it bad enough that the Foreign Minister said that Romania can, and probably should, unilaterally withdraw from the CVM, President Basescu suggested yesterday, while assuming his responsibility for the possible postponing of Schengen accession, that in case Romania is not offered a clear and definite deadline to join Schengen, the funds that were meant to be used for securing the borders should be used for other purposes, such as helping SMEs. No comment.

While, on the one hand, it does not seem fair that new conditions are added while the process is ongoing (the criteria are, after all, just of a technical nature, although, in principle, one can easily link corruption with border security), Romania should have been prepared for such a situation and should have come up with a lobbying strategy for the major EU capitals instead of the lame attempts to blackmail the big Member States with issues that can, at best, only backfire and hurt the country’s image in the EU. Unfortunately, this is just an example of Romania’s negotiation “skills” (or lack thereof) in the EU arena; if this trend continues, Romania can forget about ever exerting any influence (despite its size) in the decision-making process. The first lesson it needs to learn is how to use the power of informal mechanisms in its favour instead of falling victim to it, like in the Schengen accession story.

Update 7/1/2011:  According to EUobserver, Romania’s president Basescu announced that Romania would not take any of the proposed retaliatory measures (see above) because they could “backfire against Romania”. But Basescu  also complained about the lack of solidarity: “It was overnight and without a warning. I would have expected that one of my colleagues in the Council – either Mr Sarkozy or Ms Merkel – to say ‘look, Mr President, we will be against it.’ But they didn’t and you know that normally in the Council there is talk about solidarity.” Be that as it may, early warning  is also the task of the Romanian diplomats in Brussels…

While the interinstitutional decision-making process is making headlines (of course, depending on the topic), the internal decision-making mechanism within each EU institution is somewhat more obscure to the general public. Nevertheless, the internal workings of the institutions do influence a lot the overall EU policy making. The European Commission, with its right of initiative, is placed at the very beginning (and thus also at the core) of this process. This is where all the policy proposals originate, making it interesting to look into how they are drafted and decided upon.

First of all, we have to be clear: a policy proposal is not a mere document; it is a file that contains, beside the legislative act, a memorandum explaining the context of the decision, the results of the impact assessments and ex-ante evaluations that need to conducted, financial information, the results of the inter-service consultation, a draft press release as well as, yes, you are reading correctly, a “citizen summary” (an explanation of the decision in more accessible terms than the usual jargon). This file has to be prepared, involving formal and informal internal coordination procedures as well as the consultation of external stakeholders. All this needs to be done at this very early preparatory stage. And then there is the translation. Only after the file is complete can it go further, to the level of Heads of Cabinet. They prepare the agenda of the College meeting, by thoroughly analysing all the files at hand and trying to reach consensus in order to pave the way towards a swift adoption.

The type of procedure used for adopting a file is determined by the degree of consensus already reached at the inter-service consultation level and at the level of Heads of Cabinet.

• the oral procedure is used for the files that require a debate of the College of Commissioners; the documents concerned are usually of a more political and controversial nature and there might have been disagreements among the services concerned. The College meeting takes place every Wednesday and is prepared by the meeting of the Heads of Cabinet (the so called “Hebdo”) taking place on Mondays. The files adopted through oral procedure are the ones that stand out and attract media coverage. However, it is interesting to note, that they represent a very small percentage of the total number of Commission decisions. For example, in 2009 alone, only 215 files went through oral procedure, compared to 3129 adopted by written procedure.  Most of the oral procedure decisions are in the fields of Economic and Financial Affairs and Competition.
• the written procedure is used when all the services concerned agree and a College debate is not necessary; the file is submitted to all the Commissioners and is deemed to be adopted if none of them has any reservations before the deadline. The idea behind using this procedure is to take away some of the burden of debating files without major political interest. The number of files going through this procedure has been around 3000 each year, in the last 10 years. The written procedure is mainly used in fields like Health and Consumer Protection, Agriculture, External aid and Enterprise.
• the  empowerment procedure consists of a mandate given by the College in its meeting to one or several of its members to take measures in its name and under its responsibility, within strict limits and conditions; it is used for clearly defined management and administrative acts. After being by far the most used procedure before 2003, in the years thereafter the number of files going though this procedure ranged between 2000 and 3000 per year, with 2247 having adopted in 2009. The fields where empowerment is mostly used are Competition, Regional policy and Agriculture.
• the delegation procedure was introduced in 2003 and took away part of the file load previously decided by empowerment. The interesting thing about it is that the decisions are no longer adopted by the College as a whole or even by an empowered Commissioner; in the case of the delegation procedure, the Commission gives a mandate to a Director General or Head of Service to act in its name. This procedure is usually used for technical matters, very well regulated and where the margin of discretion is strictly limited. However, when we look at the numbers, something is quite striking: since 2003, there were on average 4000 files adopted every year through delegation (with around 4500 in 2009), making it the most used internal decision-making method of the Commission.

The policy preparation process within the Commission is a rather complex process, most of the time taking place outside the limelight. A thorough coordination amongst all services is required, which takes place both informally (e.g.meetings of thematic inter-service groups, written inter-departmental consultation, etc) and formally (the Inter-service consultation procedure, where all services must give their opinion on a certain file within a set deadline- usually 10 days and 15 days if the file has more than 20 pages). This process has an impact on the method used for adopting the decision. Something that should not be ignored is the fact that the Commission also has to consult externally, which it does through Green Papers, White Papers, expert groups meetings, etc. An impact assessment on the economic, social and environmental consequences of a proposal needs to be conducted for all major policy initiatives and legislative proposals. There is, thus, scope for the various stakeholders to interact with the Commission at this very early stage and action during the preparation stage is usually the most successful in terms of influence over policy-making.

An interesting observation can be made by looking into the various internal decision-making methods: what we usually read in the media as Commission proposals is just the tip of the iceberg- the few files that go through oral procedure every year- accounting for about 2,5% of the approximately 10000 acts adopted yearly by the Commission. The core of Commission activity rests with adopting mainly technical and administrative acts, without much political weight and thus being delegated to the bureaucratic levels of the Commission. It is a clear proof of its technocratic character that does, by no means, undermine its image as policy initiator, but puts its activity in a more balanced light.

Simon Hix on The State of European Democracy After Lisbon at the IIEA – The Institute of International and European Affairs.

Three waves | Roll into port together | The trio is home. (Herman Van Rompuy)

What does this mean in practice, what are the advantages of the Trio and its relations with the newly established players? It might be too early to judge, but we can already get some insight from the experience of the Spanish-Belgian- Hungarian Trio. Its work has been reflected on at the launch of a report on the contribution of 14 European think-tanks to the Spanish, Belgian and Hungarian Trio Presidency of the European Union.

While, in the pre-Lisbon setting, the past, current and forthcoming Presidencies were encouraged to work together in order to ensure coherence and continuity, the fact that now this collaboration is made official (and compulsory), gives it a boost, by creating common practices. The civil servants from the three countries meet regularly, in sectoral structures and at various levels, to discuss the priorities for the 18 months. This starts about two years before the first Presidency takes office and ends after the third has finished its mandate, not before making a thorough evaluation of the Trio’ s performance. All this may sound like  a normal bureaucratic procedure, a pure coordination task. Yet, it is more than that. It is an exercise that helps civil servants  and politicians with different (sometimes very different) administrative and political cultures to get to know and understand each other and start thinking out of the “national” box. Thus, in order to draft a common programme, the three countries try to take on board each other’s interests, apart from their own national one, leading to a set of priorities that each of them can feel the ownership of. Moreover, these priorities that have been agreed by three Member States have a bigger weight when it comes to defining each country’s own strategic lines for he 6 months period.

The protagonists of the first official trio, Spain, Belgium and Hungary, seem to have found this exercise very useful. At the symbolic level, they decided to use the same logo design, with only the colours of the national flags changing. A common website was also created (www.eutrio.eu); however, contrary to expectations, this web address is currently used just as an alias for the Spanish Presidency website (which, in its turn, does not have a lot of references to the Trio and not in the most visible of places). At the more practical level, the Trio has drafted a single programme, instead of three different programmes as it used to be the case; however, it seems that each country still follows its own set of priorities, de facto reducing the common programme to a strategic framework, while still allowing specific Member States to take credit for certain achievements that happened to take place in their 6 months term. (Update: the Spanish Presidency is already “taking stock” of the achievements of the first third of its term, coming up with a very positive assessment. No reference to the common Trio programme and the progress in terms of that, in case you were wondering).

During the preparatory stage, the Trio had some daring ideas, such as having one country chairing one working group or/and Council formation for 18 months, while the other two countries chair others, or to have interchangeable chairs from the three countries. These arrangements would have reinforced the idea of a common programme and a common identity; but they proved to be too forward-thinking for this moment, adding up to the current post-Lisbon institutional confusion. Perhaps this is still something to think about for the next Trio (Poland, Denmark and Cyprus).

It still remains to be seen what role the rotating Presidency will carve for itself in the new interinstitutional power balance. Even though most of the visibility is taken up by Herman Van Rompuy, one has to remember that it is still the rotating Presidency that chairs the 270 Council Working Groups, the COREPER meetings, as well as nine out of ten Council formations, including the General Affairs Council (GAC), whose horizontal coordination role can prove to be very important strategically. Another key issue is how the Trio Presidencies will relate to the newly established institution- the European Council- and its growing powers, especially in the economic area. While the usual working practices of the Council are of a bottom-up nature (starting at Working Group level, then going to COREPER and only then- and only the controversial, unsolved issues- going to the level of Ministers), the increased role of the European Council might see these practices change, allowing for the possibility of a top-down approach in certain areas.

Irrespective of the way the Trio will interpret and fulfill its tasks, it is important to remember, when looking at the institutional structure of post-Lisbon EU, that the rotating Presidency is still playing an important role. Practice will show, in the following months, if the idea of an official Trio has given it more strength, coherence and continuity. And all this beyond a common logo and a programmatic set of common priorities.

There has been a big debate about the SWIFT affair in the last weeks. But, looking into the file in more detail, something else than the often discussed content got my attention: the code of the procedure: NLE/2009/0190. A quick research led me to the full name of the procedure: Interinstitutional non-legislative procedure. For those who (for one reason or another) are interested in knowing what this procedure covers and cannot figure it out from the large list of documents labeled post-Lisbon with the NLE code, I am afraid I don’t have good news. The new code covers all the procedures where the European Parliament is involved but which do not fall under the new ordinary legislative procedure (formerly known as co-decision) or the special legislative procedures (the old consultation and assent).

Quite broad, right? Well, some refining will be on the agenda of the institutions, threatening to keep some people busy for at least a few months until all the innovations and their implications have been spelled out at the practical level.

First of all what is this European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI)? It is a new tool to involve citizens in EU decision making. Basically you need 1 Mio signatures  of European citizens to call on the European Commission to draft a policy proposal. Read some background info here.

Let’s look in the treaty, Art 11 of the TEU:

Not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of Member States may take the initiative of inviting the European Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties.

The procedures and conditions required for such a citizens’ initiative shall be determined in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 24 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

The problem is the last sentence. At the moment negotiations are under way about  how the specific details should look like. The European Commission published a  green paper and a public consultation just ended on 31.1.2010. Legal uncertainty is a problem if you start a campaign now, but there are even more  problems of the “Free Sunday” campaign:

(1) Legal uncertainty.  It is risky to start a campaign when the legal details are not yet clear. The amount of the signatures might be clear but what about electronic votes? What personal details need to be submitted? What is a “significant number” of Member States? Will there be a time limit between the first and the last signature?  Some of the things have been debated but as long as there is no certainty it seems like a waste of time to start collecting signatures or even to “build momentum”.

(2) Campaign backing: The idea comes from Martin Kastler a Bavarian MEP, not the most innovative start but fair enough. At the moment there are 5 civil society organisations supporting the campaign: 2 Christian groups that are closely linked to the German WWII expellees  (“Heimatvertriebenen”) , two national association of Catholics and a local (protestant) working group of the CDU. First of all, this is a relatively small amount of organisations. All of them Christian groups and all of them based in Germany. One the one hand it is not surprising that religious groups are among the supporters for such an idea, but is it enough to get support only from Germany when you want to organise a European campaign? The main Catholic and Protestant organisations in Germany are not even  included and you can’t tell me that religious groups in other countries are not well organised…  But to give the campaign more credibility it is certainly a  good idea to include other non-religious groups. Trade unions spring to mind, but also various NGOs and parties might support you. Interestingly, Kastner mentions that in his press release that he hopes to get the backing of other groups as well – but why start a campaign page already if you could get massive support with some more lobbying?

(3) Website and social media: So you have a campaign website. Very good. But is it clever to have it in 2 languages only (English and German)?  I know it is difficult to translate a page into many languages but if you had more supporters in other countries it might be easier. And I found a facebook fan page. Well done. But again: only in German and only 377 fans… Other social media gadgets are missing, no twitter, no blog, no discussion and most importantly no tools to spread the message: banners, maybe user submitted campaign material. A successful online campaing needs to be creative!

(4) Media campaign. There is none. A quick look into the German google news reveals clearly that there is no hype whatsoever. A couple of regional and Christian German newspapers copied the press release, that’s it.

(5)  Problem with the free-sunday.eu campaign is the lack of content. Keep the Sunday free of work – ok, but how exactly? There is no background info, no specific legislative proposals, no overview of the legal situation in different European countries, only one page with a couple of bullet points that outline some objectives. However, lacking a clear legislative proposal, the danger is that others label you as not being relevant, which might not only kill the campaign itself but also discourage others. First thing to remember is that there needs to be a specific issue in which the Commission can act in accordance with the Treaties! So is it an appropriate proposal for an ECI? Unfortunately we cannot evaluate this based on the campaign website!

In case the the campaign has the aim to get more support for the cause and start a proper ECI later – make it clear and ask for specific proposals for example as part of a “public citizen consultation”! After all you want to include citizens, right? Are you looking for actual signatures or just for supporters that are willing to contribute to the real campaign – again this is not clear and might not be beneficial for your campaign.

(6) The slogan. “Mom and dad belong to us on Sunday.” is inspired by a  German trade union slogan from 1956. Is that enough for 2010?

First impressions, unfortunately, count – especially for campaigns. The free-sunday.eu campaign is unprofessional and looks amateurish. Let’s hope the next campaign looks more promising (animal rights groups are usually very professional…)

Article would have not existed without Moray Gilland – Thanks a lot for the twitter discussion

Update: Another rather critical take on the issue by  Matthew Lowry’s Tamsanian Devil.

Anyway, the video is a nice reminder what the POTEC  (that sounds quite cool – is there also an official short form?) actually does – arguably not that much. So no need to get overexicted by this new position. A video that should definitely be watched by journalists and governmental website editors:

However, despite all the talk about the European Council President, this is actually the more important position for one single reason:  The High Rep will be able to use the EU foreign policy machinery including (post EEAS) – Commission staff (RELEX), Council Secretariat staff (including ESDP and CFSP tools plus all the  ‘Special Representatives’) and the newly created European External Action Service.

Moreover the new High Rep will be a Vice-President of the European Commission and chair the Foreign Affairs Councils. Therefore I agree with Simon Hix who said “The president could end up being all prestige and no power, while the high representative is real power and little prestige.” The European Council President only chairs a couple of summits and has no job description – it is not even clear whether he will get office staff… Well, one sentence in the Lisbon treaty could  become problematic:

It is the Council President (President of the European Council) who will “ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy”. He shall do that, however: “without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”.

So, team play will be necessary at least to a certain extent. However, it is very unfortunate that the question of who becomes High Rep depends on who will be chosen as European Council President – and not the other way round!

So let’s have a quick round of possible candidates:

Today, speculations included David Miliband (UK Foreign Secretary -ruled himself out on twitter!), frequently mentioned is also Olli Rehn (EU enlargement commissioner) as well as Ursula Plassnik (former Foreign Minister of Austria) and Dora Bakoyannis (former Foreign Minister of Greece). Several other names have been mentioned in the last couple of months: former External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten, former Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel and former NATO Secretary-General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer.

Anyone in there who could be the next High Rep? I think David Miliband could be a good candidate but he might not be experienced enough – and, given his ambition to become the next leader of the Labour party, I doubt whether he is a serious candidate. Let’s ask him in 5 years again!  What about the rest? They all seem rather boring with a lack vision for EU foreign policy. Unfortunately I do not know much about Ursula Plassnik  and Dora Bakoyannis. Chris Patten and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer are certainly well respected in Brussels.  Especially Jaap de Hoop Scheffer could be a serious candidate given his NATO experience – he would be a solid and diplomatic High Rep without being too demanding towards member states.  Olli Rehn lacks experience and being EU enlargement Commissioner may not be enough to get the job. However, a High Rep without political ambition (de Hoop Scheffer) or lack of experience (Rehn) could exactly be the sort of person the European Council is looking for…

But is that everything we can come up with?  The High Rep should be THE foreign policy authority of the EU, with the ability to negotiate deals in the Foreign Affairs Council  – so the person needs to be high profile and should have considerable foreign policy experience.  European Foreign Policy is one policy in which citizens want to see a stronger EU. The new High Rep needs to be able to communicate this clearly and passionately. Moreover, the person is expected to negotiate worldwide – so there we need someone recognizable with a proven track record in international negotiation. (If Tony Blair was serious about a EU job – he should go for that one and not the one with prestige and the misleading title).  So who else could be doing this kind of job:

Joschka Fischer – a former German foreign minister. He would certainly tick all the boxes. He has huge foreign policy experience, is known internationally and with good connections in the Middle East and in the US (after being a Visiting Fellow at Princeton and working in Madeleine Albright’s consultancy). Recently, he started working in support of the Nabucco pipeline. He has been a very charismatic and popular politician – and can still fill conference centres in London, Brussels or Washington! He would certainly be able to give the EU a real voice in foreign affairs. That unfortunately rules him out -  exactly that is not wanted by our dear politicians.

Martti Ahtisaari – a former president of Finland.  Wouldn’t it be great if Obama and Athisaari met and the press could have a headline like “Two Nobel peace prize winners demand…” – certainly Ahtisaari is very knowledgeable and respected internationally. He has an excellent reputation as a conflict mediator (he got the Nobel peace price for that!) and  has been an active advocate of a more powerful EU foreign policy. Again not the best thing to do in the present political climate. He might lack a bit of charisma (compared to Fischer…) which could be seen as an asset by the European Council…

Carl Bildt – the current Swedish foreign minister. Another strong candidate judging on his vast foreign policy experience. He is the only serving foreign minister of all the candidates which is an advantage because connections are important!  However, some (France, Germany) often claim he is too outspoken on Russia. He is a well known blogger and often grabs media attention with some bold statements. Moreover, being in the spotlight of EU politics due to the Swedish Council Presidency might be helpful (although the bold statement could ruin it…).

So, who has realistic chances? At the moment the race seems very open (or the secret is being kept well…) – Jaap de Hoop Sheffer, Chris Patten and  Olli Rehn could be realistic candidates, the joker could be Carl Bildt. Chances are that we get someone that has not been subject of any rumours lately. (The French are suspiciously silent…) And obviously it always depends a lot on who will become European Council President in terms of political and geographical balance…

But one thing is certain: unfortunately the best candidates will have absolutely no chance of getting the job!

The Top 10 Craziest Things Ever Said During a U.N. Speech

David Mitchell:

If academic endeavour had always been vetted in advance for practicality, we wouldn’t have the aeroplane or the iPhone, just a better mammoth trap.

Richard Laming

It is ironic that the people who complain most about the complexity of the treaty are the very same people who would complain if it was simple,…

Vaclav Klaus

The train carrying the treaty is going so fast and it’s so far that it can’t be stopped or returned, no matter how much some of us would want that.

Silvio Berlusconi

“I’m doing what I do with a sense of sacrifice. I don’t really like it. Not at all,” (…) “Very often there is a lot of dirty dealing; there is really the gutter press, worse than that, the shameless and sickly. It’s a difficult life to be responsible for leading the government in a country like Italy.”

“I never made any gaffes, not even one, every gaffe is invented by the newspapers.”

American official (asked about Cameron’s ECR group in the EP)

I do not see any upsides in the new grouping. I can only see downsides. In life it is normally best to do things when they have an upside.

The categories:

First, the president should be, well, boring — like Brussels itself. Politicians have knocked down candidates for being too controversial or too outspoken. Second, he should likely hold center-right or Christian Democratic political tendencies, given that Europe itself is headed that direction. Third, he should come from a country that uses the euro — showing full fealty to the concept of the union. Fourth, he should come from a small European country — anything other than Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, which normally dominate the union’s affairs. Finally, two wild-card characteristics: He should ideally speak French and have opposed the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq — if not at the time, then soon afterward.

Read the article (with more less detailed profiles of each candidate) here. Obviously the list is debatable: For example, it seems strange to include Angela Merkel (not boring?) and Anders Fogh Rasmussen but not Mary Robinson… also candidates from the Iberian peninsula might might not be considered since Commission President Barroso is from Portugal, to a lesser extent that might also be true for Polish candidates (Buzek = President of the European Parliament). I was also wondering about the language skills of the contenders… (Most of them fluent in French? – And what about English ?). One important category is missing: The “I made the case for the EU while being in office” – category.
Oh, and  sadly even the analysts (in this case: “assistant editor with a degree from Harvard”) of Foreign Policy fall into the trap of talking about a “EU President”…

1. There is a difference between the European Council, the Council of the EU and the Council of Europe – just look it up! Try to get your facts straight about the rotating presidency and EU terminology in general.

2. The Polish and  Czech parliaments approved the Lisbon treaty already! Only 2 signatures are missing.  So, please don’t write that both countries  still need to vote on the treaty…

3. And while we are at it: Do your research on the competences of the Czech president (hint: Czech constitution, some basics on parliamentary vs. presidential systems)

4. There is no actual link between the Irish Yes and a European Council President Blair – The treaty merely creates the position of a European Council President and not, I repeat: NOT: EU president, President of Europe etc.) Actually, the position is more like a permanent chairman… Tony Blair seems to be one of the people that are interested in getting the job. So try to get hold of other nominees as well! If you write a opinion piece you might want to check the issue of open nominations and the stopblair petition (more arguments against Blair here).

5. Anyway, forget about the “European Council president” for a moment.  It is much more important who will be nominated for the new Commission. And who will be the next High Representative for Foreign Affairs. All of these jobs are actually more powerful than the European Council president.

Thank you!

I am pretty sure that the  pressure on Klaus will be enormous. There are already rumors that Angela Merkel is preparing a “diplomatic sweetener” for him, whatever that means… Taking into account that the Czech Parliament ratified the treaty and the Czech president does not have any powers to veto the treaty,  it is his constitutional obligation to sign it eventually (apparently the problem is that the Czech constitution does not specify how long the President is allowed to postpone his  signature). Obviously he will use the argument that he needs to wait until the constitutional court has issued the ruling on a complaint of some senators. But in the end I am pretty sure that he will sign and that he will not have the guts to wait until the Conservatives form a government in the UK (which might happen next summer)…

However, the wider context is noteworthy: After a almost a decade of debate (Laeken 2001, Convention, Constitutional treaty, …) it seems that we end up with this mini reform treaty. I think most of the other major EU treaties contained more far-reaching reforms than this one. Basically only a couple of things are really innovative:  new double majority voting in more policy areas, a strengthened role for the European Parliament, some clarifications regarding competences, and some improvements in the field of EU foreign policy.

One thing is quite clear, there won’t be another big EU treaty for the foreseeable future  given the difficulty to get such a text ratified by 27 member states. A positive side effect might be that we can finally concentrate on policy issues and leave this institutional debate behind us – at least for a couple of years.  However, the Lisbon Treaty is far from being perfect and it is quite possible that it will create a number of institutional problems. The future will bring new challenges and new reforms might be necessary. And let’s face it: every reform needs to be reformed. So how is it possible to address these challenges and ensure further EU reform, even with 30+ member states (and with people like David Cameron)?

One possibility is to move towards thematic treaties. For example a “issue treaty” on climate change, or one on foreign policy or on police cooperation. These treaties would address one specific issue only – which seems much easier to communicate. These treaties would contain a list of competences for EU institutions as well as national institutions. Moreover, such an issue treaty would address the decision making in this specific policy area and  maybe even include  specific policy aims (reducing emission by 30%, creating a new agency or a new position, banning a certain chemical substance,  introducing a certain measure…whatever). One thing must be included however: if a country rejects one of those treaties, everyone must be clear about the consequences. Basically, a rejection would result in an opt out (similar to Schengen, Euro) but with the possibility to join later.  Of course the result would be an even more complex EU. But maybe this is the price to pay for a bigger and more diverse EU…

Jason O’Mahony explains the reasons behind the guide:

So why write this guide? Because I was so underwhelmed by the Yes side in the last referendum. We were so bad at communicating our message, and at replying to the, let’s face it, tinfoil-inside-my-hat-to-stop-Martian-radio-signals threats coming from elements of the No side. So I decided to do something about it. I wrote The Spoofer’s Guide to the Lisbon Treaty to explain what I understood and felt about an EU that wasn’t the evil monster that the No side were claiming. I put it together with some friends and sent it out, where, judging by the emails I got back from Ireland and the continent and the US, it struck a chord with people.

Here’s the new version. Those of you who read the old one will recognise a lot of it, but there’s also some new stuff in it. It is a biased guide, in that I am biased and support the Treaty, but I’d like to think that it’s not slavish about it.

Read it!

The powers that the EU ought to have are those that the member states cannot exercise effectively on their own: no more and no less.

Nosemonkey:

the EU’s “democratic deficit”[...] is actually preserving the sovereignty of the member states.

Jean Quatremer:

(Solana) L’homme qui “parle toutes les langues sans qu’on puisse en comprendre aucune”.

Joschka Fischer:

Karlsruhe ballert in seiner Entscheidung mit verfassungsrechtlichen Kanonen auf imaginierte Spatzen: “ Wenn man das Urteil bis zum Ende lese, gewinne man den Eindruck, „man befände sich in einer Fraktionssitzung der britischen Konservativen“.

Norman Cohn (from the 1995 foreword to Warrant for Genocide (1967) – via Martin Amis:

There exists a subterranean world where pathological fantasies disguised as ideas are churned out by crooks and half-educated fanatics [notably the lower clergy] for the benefit of the ignorant and superstitious. There are times when this underworld emerges from the depths and suddenly fascinates, captures and dominates multitudes of usually sane and responsible people, who thereupon take leave of sanity and responsibility. And it occasionally happens that this underworld becomes a political powerand changes the course of history.

Wolfgang Münchau:

A Europe presided over by Messrs Barroso and Blair is a modern European hell. Only it is no joke.

Tony Barber:

But it is almost an iron EU law that the people first mentioned in connection with big jobs are seldom the ones that get them.

The text will be discussed during the  June summit of the European Council this week in Brussels.

Sorry, no time for further comments. Probably a law degree would be helpful to analyse it properly…

Update: Read more over at The European Citizen blog!

Update: The final text as part of the European Council Presidency Conclusions (pdf)

Declan Ganley is clearly a one man show. He wants to turn the EP elections in a Europe wide referendum about … yes about what exactly? He is against the “undemocratic” Lisbon treaty and against the “unaccountable elite in Brussels” but what does he really want to achieve?

Somehow Ganley reminds me of a classic modern populist (Ronald Schill, Jörg Haider, maybe even Oskar Lafontaine) although in quite another context.  (and also without the usual racist and law and order attitudes) Furthermore, Ganley only focuses on one single issue (anti-Lisbon basically) which is quite typical for any populist movements.

The only content worth reading on the new Libertas website is the “Facts” section that addresses “Libertas myths” which is weird because it gives the impression that Libertas is on the defensive and at the same time a kind of martyr as it seems to communicate one thing:  “We are not the establishment!”

Mark Mardell interviewed Ganley a few days ago about Libertas, you can listen to a short clip here. Actually the piece is quite interesting as it reveals the lack of any positive political vision. Ganley talks a lot about “turning the elections in a referendum against the Brussels elites” and “bringing back Europe to the people”.

His rhethoric is not very pan-European either. He hardly mentions anything that is relevant for people outside Ireland and the UK (ok, maybe because it was a BBC interview..). And even for Ireland and the UK he links everything with the distinctive British (and Irish) referendum debates. Ganley also does not seem to understand the difference between an election and a referendum which he shows by comparing the elections in the US with the Lisbon treaty referendum in Ireland.

What he also fails to deliver is any positive vision, being against something is just not enough (well, maybe it is enough for some voters?). He only talks about this one election as a ‘one-off’ opportunity for voters to show their discontent to the “unaccountable elites in Brussels”. But what about the future of the European Parliament elections and the future of the European Parliament itself? What does Libertas want to achieve in the day to day business of the Parliament? What Ganley’s vision for the insitutional setup of the EU? It seems he only wants so send a “strong message” to the leaders of Europe without any substance or as Ganley puts it “a clear no vote”.The only firm aim is a “25 page” document that would replace the Lisbon Treaty.

The claim of having a 25 page document is very interesting as it can mean different things for different target groups:

One option is a EU with very limited powers and hardly any competences as a 25 page document is not long enough to specify any political and institutional compromises. Very attractive to the Anti-EU camp and the supporters of a withdrawal policy.

The second option is a EU with state attributes similar to the US with clear federal divisions. Very attractive for federalists and very optimistic EU supporters.

Ganley seems to think that he can get supporters from both “camps” which I doubt he can achieve. I think by meeting up with known “EU-sceptics” and the lack of having an actual draft of the 25 page document he will only get votes from the Anti-EU camp.

So what can we expect from Libertas? Not much, unfortunately. Probably EP candidates will not be very prolific with the exception of the top candidates that probably will come from other fringe movements plus a few known EU sceptics. I am sure there will be some scandals with candidates that are lower ranked and not screened properly.

The campaign itself is likely to focus on traditional media strategies, lots of TV spots and big poster campaigns. (similar to the campaign in Ireland)

At the moment it is very hard to say anything about the content of the campaign. However, I suspect it will be a negative campaign. We will see a lot of false information and a lot of populist statements that include phrases with a mixture of “democracy now” “Europe for the people ” “Vote against Brussels bureaucrats”. Lots of attacks against the “elites in Brussels” that are “not in touch with us, the people” etc. of course anti-Lisbon but without any clear alternative besides a very nebulous concept of a “new deal for Europe”.

Here some key findings:

• The main reason for abstaining in this referendum was lack of understanding/knowledge (46%), which is far in excess of any other voluntary or circumstantial reason given for not voting.
• Much of the Yes vote is underpinned by a strong general feeling of pro-Europeanism rather than Treaty specific motivations.
• Twenty-six percent of No voters mentioned Treaty specific elements that were of concern to them.
• The main reason cited for voting No was ‘lack of knowledge/information/ understanding’ at
  42%. There can be little doubt that this emerged as the primary reason for people voting
  No.
• At a wider level, an EU knowledge deficit is clearly present which has undoubtedly contributed to the No vote.  Knowledge of EU institutions and how they work appears to be particularly low.  The difficulty of advocating a referendum that is based on the premise of institutional reform in this environment is apparent.

So, the report suggests that a lack of knowledge/information/understanding was the main reason for the referendum outcome: At the same time there seems to be little willingness to do something about it:

• Despite not having a good understanding of  how EU institutions operate, there was fairly limited appetite for additional information, particularly among younger group participants. Few felt that they would realistically take the time or go to the bother to inform themselves in any great detail. Older group participants (those aged 35+), were more open to learning more and felt that if the EU  was going  to become more important to Ireland then it was important for them to be better informed.

Let’s have a look at the ‘issues’:

• ‘No’ voters were far more likely to believe that erosion of Irish neutrality, end of control over abortion and conscription to a European army were part of the Lisbon Treaty, revealing key cracks in the debate.
• Loss of Commissioner was also a common concern on the No side.
• When asked directly, respondents cited the issue of protection of workers’ rights as being
  “very important” more often than any other issue (of a defined set of issues) relating to
  Ireland and the EU. Retaining control over public services in the future was similarly cited.
• Concerns over specific aspects of the Treaty loom large, particularly perceptions of an erosion of neutrality, the Commissioner issue (which many do not seem to properly understand), Corporate tax and to a lesser degree abortion.

Well, the report clearly did not come up with any surprising results. Most of it has been debated over and over again. So I will not get into the debate whether referendums are useful (hint: they are not!) or whether the Lisbon treaty is too complex (hint: yes it is!) or whether the EU is a big conspiracy theory (hint: it is not).

However, one question is of course still the same: What to do now?  – A new referendum on the same text? No new referendum and a parliamentary ratification followed by an referendum on one or two treaty issues? A new EU treaty and negotiations from scratch? A kind of “Irish Protocol” that addresses the problematic issues despite their irrelevance? The report only suggests that any new vote on an unchanged document would have a negative result again.

The only certain fact is the existence of the “EU knowledge deficit” which is probably a widespread problem everywhere in the EU. I think this is a structural problem that needs to be addressed on different levels: The EU should be included in school curricula and there needs to be a better media coverage and reporting of EU affairs. Of course local, national and European politicians need to explain the role of the EU with more honesty. At the same time the EU needs to engage more people in debating European issues, some institutional reforms would also be helpful … Ok, enough wishful thinking for today!

Jean-Claude Juncker, PM of Luxembourg made a few interesting comments at a conference that took place in Brussels just one day before the European Council:

“Politicians give the impression that Europe is being built against their will. Governments always try to explain in their countries that they have won against Europe”

And asked about a possible Plan B…

“In fact the Lisbon Treaty was the Plan B of the project for a European Constitution. If we still change the text, it will be a very small B”

And he goes on explaining the reasons for the mess we are in:

“Europe is not sufficiently proud of what it does (…) and the reason is that no government in particular can claim the merits from these achievements. Since governments like to attract the public’s attention only on their own achievements and not on common achievements, nobody speaks about common achievements.”

Let’s hope he will also have a word with his collegues at the European Council! Oh yes, and he seems to be a reader of this blog…