Everything you need to know about diplomacy. I just found a hilarious one pager on “Terms used in multilateral negotiations and what they usually mean” – In fact I found it in my cupboard in a file that is 5-6 years old. After some googeling I found a very similar version in a 2009 book called “The Weak Send Rocks, The Strong Send Rockets
Kosmopolito
The Blog with the European perspective
Tag Archives: EU politics
David Cameron rules out ‘in-out referendum’ on EU membership
Well, technically he did not really answer the question (“I am afraid to disappoint the honorable gentleman and his wife… We are better off inside the EU but making changes to it…”) but a referendum is definitely not on the agenda. Cameron will not risk it as he seems to be afraid of a negative outcome. (More on that issue soon on this blog… I hope) Continue reading
BrusselsLeaks is back
In December 2010, the mysterious Brusselsleaks website appeared. The idea was simple: Think of wikileaks in a EU/Brussels context.
Now BrusselsLeaks is back with a new website and a new logo! Well, the logo is rather basic and it looks like the Ukrainian flag turned upside down. 
A couple of weeks ago we wrote a lenghty post about brusselsleaks in which we critisised some of its features. As far as I can see it the most crucial problems have not (yet) been addressed. (https is nice, but not using tor remains a security flaw!)
The new website is based on the wikileaks theme (not sure whether that is such a good idea as it looks like a copy cat now) and the first item is a mirrored cable – originally published by wikileaks (not sure why it is there). Let’s hope this is just a test and the real stuff is coming soon…
More problematic for a website dedicated to leaking documents is the usage of google analytics. Google analytics can be used to trace back visitors and it generates very detailed (some might say too detailed!) user reports. The problem with Google Analytics can be practical (if someone hacks into your GA account or gets hold of the google account password) or indeed legal (you might be required to hand over the logs, or google might help some investigators without telling you …you never know!) – both scenarios are certainly no good news for any potential whistle-blower.
The forgotten Trio
Among the institutional changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty, some have been more present in the media and public debate than others. Three months after the Treaty entered into force, we can still read at least a couple of articles a day about the President of the European Council, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and, of course, the External Action Service that is now being designed. But with all the attention given to these new actors, one of the old ones has been slightly forgotten. In fact,with all the confusion in the media, it took quite a while for people to learn that the rotating Presidency of the Council of Ministers will still exist and work pretty much as before, with the unofficially existing 18-months Trio now being ‘officialised’ by the Treaty.
Three waves | Roll into port together | The trio is home. (Herman Van Rompuy)
What does this mean in practice, what are the advantages of the Trio and its relations with the newly established players? It might be too early to judge, but we can already get some insight from the experience of the Spanish-Belgian- Hungarian Trio. Its work has been reflected on at the launch of a report on the contribution of 14 European think-tanks to the Spanish, Belgian and Hungarian Trio Presidency of the European Union.
While, in the pre-Lisbon setting, the past, current and forthcoming Presidencies were encouraged to work together in order to ensure coherence and continuity, the fact that now this collaboration is made official (and compulsory), gives it a boost, by creating common practices. The civil servants from the three countries meet regularly, in sectoral structures and at various levels, to discuss the priorities for the 18 months. This starts about two years before the first Presidency takes office and ends after the third has finished its mandate, not before making a thorough evaluation of the Trio’ s performance. All this may sound like a normal bureaucratic procedure, a pure coordination task. Yet, it is more than that. It is an exercise that helps civil servants and politicians with different (sometimes very different) administrative and political cultures to get to know and understand each other and start thinking out of the “national” box. Thus, in order to draft a common programme, the three countries try to take on board each other’s interests, apart from their own national one, leading to a set of priorities that each of them can feel the ownership of. Moreover, these priorities that have been agreed by three Member States have a bigger weight when it comes to defining each country’s own strategic lines for he 6 months period.
The protagonists of the first official trio, Spain, Belgium and Hungary, seem to have found this exercise very useful. At the symbolic level, they decided to use the same logo design, with only the colours of the national flags changing. A common website was also created (www.eutrio.eu); however, contrary to expectations, this web address is currently used just as an alias for the Spanish Presidency website (which, in its turn, does not have a lot of references to the Trio and not in the most visible of places). At the more practical level, the Trio has drafted a single programme, instead of three different programmes as it used to be the case; however, it seems that each country still follows its own set of priorities, de facto reducing the common programme to a strategic framework, while still allowing specific Member States to take credit for certain achievements that happened to take place in their 6 months term. (Update: the Spanish Presidency is already “taking stock” of the achievements of the first third of its term, coming up with a very positive assessment. No reference to the common Trio programme and the progress in terms of that, in case you were wondering).
During the preparatory stage, the Trio had some daring ideas, such as having one country chairing one working group or/and Council formation for 18 months, while the other two countries chair others, or to have interchangeable chairs from the three countries. These arrangements would have reinforced the idea of a common programme and a common identity; but they proved to be too forward-thinking for this moment, adding up to the current post-Lisbon institutional confusion. Perhaps this is still something to think about for the next Trio (Poland, Denmark and Cyprus).
It still remains to be seen what role the rotating Presidency will carve for itself in the new interinstitutional power balance. Even though most of the visibility is taken up by Herman Van Rompuy, one has to remember that it is still the rotating Presidency that chairs the 270 Council Working Groups, the COREPER meetings, as well as nine out of ten Council formations, including the General Affairs Council (GAC), whose horizontal coordination role can prove to be very important strategically. Another key issue is how the Trio Presidencies will relate to the newly established institution- the European Council- and its growing powers, especially in the economic area. While the usual working practices of the Council are of a bottom-up nature (starting at Working Group level, then going to COREPER and only then- and only the controversial, unsolved issues- going to the level of Ministers), the increased role of the European Council might see these practices change, allowing for the possibility of a top-down approach in certain areas.
Irrespective of the way the Trio will interpret and fulfill its tasks, it is important to remember, when looking at the institutional structure of post-Lisbon EU, that the rotating Presidency is still playing an important role. Practice will show, in the following months, if the idea of an official Trio has given it more strength, coherence and continuity. And all this beyond a common logo and a programmatic set of common priorities.
The problems of EU debates
After reading recent posts by Martin Westlake and Julien Frisch I actually remembered a post on “EU debates” that I wrote a couple of months ago but somehow forgot to publish. It is rather an exploratory post, very general and patchy and open to new ideas. I want to look at the nature of EU debates without getting into any ideological debate. And after writing this blog for almost 2 years, I think there are numerous problems of debating EU issues online as well as in the “real world”. Here some reasons and possible solutions:
However, to put it into context of the debate, let’s look at the main argument of Julien Frisch who thinks rightly that “The problem of European political communication is that it is not filling our attention on a daily basis because it focuses on the wrong notion of “importance”. Of course it is debatable whether importance as such exists or whether it is a construct of the media/society. So if we accept the latter we should ask ourselves why EU debates are generally constructed as not being inportant?
1. facts vs. myths
Every EU debate at some point touches the issue of EU myths. What does this tell us about the quality of the debate? The fact-myth problem in debating the EU is a time consuming one with two implications: (1) it only reinforces the ideological standpoint of the reader and the commentator; and (2) people tend to forget about the real issues at stake. This shows that something is missing. I would suggest it has something to do with education. Interestingly, not many “national” legislative myths do exist (at least I tend to believe that, but I could be wrong about that…)
2. facts vs. oversimplification
Closely connected to myths is the tendency to oversimplify EU issues. One example is the notoriously used “Brussels wants…” phrase. But also the battle motive is very popular: Head of state 1 vs. Head of state 2. It is very handy to forget that different actors (Commission, Parliament, national ministers, lobbyists, NGOs,…) are involved in the decision making procedure. The European Parliament has a similar problem, citizens do not link their MEPs (in case they know them!) with any EU policies.
Another tendency is a kind of ‘conspiracy component’. Lots of people conveniently buy into some sort of conspiracy theory when it comes to EU institutions. I want to emphasize two points: (1) In every political structure there needs to be a certain degree of secrecy in order for the system to function. (2) The institutional setting of the EU is quite complicated and, yes, the EU is a huge bureaucracy.
The result of overlooking both aspect leads to the perception that the EU is a huge “anti- democratic conspiracy” and lots of people also tend to believe that there is some sort of masterplan somewhere behind closed doors. I do not want to deny that there are indeed problems regarding democratic accountability in the EU but people tend to forget where they actually come from… Paradoxically, both points are also interconnected: If the EU acts not coherently (because of its institutional setting) it rightly gets criticized. But if the EU tries to coordinate policies and approaches (similar to the coordination between national ministries) it gets accused of too much secrecy and not enough transparency. I do not want to defend deals behind closed doors but it is rather difficult to streamline positions of 27 member states (including internal disagreements between ministries!), several European Commission DGs as well as the necessity to deal with lobbyists and other organizations that all want to have a say in EU policy making!
3.institutions vs. policy
Every EU debate at some point turns to the legitimacy question of EU institutions. Of course this is important for any future development of the EU and it also shows that EU institutions are far from being perfect. At the same time, the debate about policy content is missing. Public debates never discuss policy options at an early stage.
4. General popular apathy.
Ok, this is a topic on its own. However, the majority of European citizens seem neither very enthusiastic nor concerned about the EU. They simply do not care about the EU because it is not something one can easily relate to, it is too far away from every day life and it is really boring (that is how it is perceived). Even the European success stories (generally related to the “four freedoms”) are usually taken for granted. I am not very optimistic here, probably this is not gonna change any time soon…
Conclusions
I my opinion EU debates take place too late. Especially national media only reports about EU initiatives after their adoption in the Council, or more accurately, in that moment the national parliament debates it. The debate needs to start earlier in order to have any impact on proposals. I think two major reforms should take place:
1. It is still cumbersome for non-experts to monitor the EU decision making process. Especially the internet and new online tools have the potential to make it easier to monitor and control EU decision making processes. Even though the europa.eu portal contains most of the information, it needs a serious relaunch. A new EU portal needs to be transparent, with a focus on policy processes that makes it easy to follow documents, combined with some interactive elements.
2. Education seems to be the key. Topics such as EU institutions and decision-making procedures need to be integrated in all school curricula as a core element at an early stage. Also national newspapers and TV stations should find ways to integrate EU news in their daily news coverage.
3. The European Parliament or better MEPs individually need to strengthen their relations with national parliaments/MPs. At the same time, national parliaments should be encouraged to engage more with ‘Brussels’ in order not to be surprised in the end… Needless to say that a lot of MEPs should step up their efforts to communicate with their constituency.
4. Further institutional reform (even though that is neither on the agenda nor very popular these days…) that addresses legitimacy, accountability and efficiency issues.
5. Better politicians for Europe! Although some improvements have been made in the last couple of years, there is still a tendency that Brussels/Strassbourg is seen as a retirement posting. However, it is a good sign that lately MEP and Commissioners were appointed national ministers!
The Romanian face of justice
In the aftermath of the report issued by the European Commission on the Romanian justice system and fight against corruption, many comments and interpretations have emerged in the Romanian press . This was to be expected. One of the most prominent debates stirred by the report these days is about the re-confirmation of Daniel Morar as Chief Attorney of the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA). (more here, here and here)
His mandate is due to expire on August 12 and various scenarios have been voiced in the media that all aim at Morar’s replacement. The Social- Democrats (PSD) want to change the procedural rules that regulate the appointment of the head of DNA. The Liberals, that for a while now have, more openly than not, sided with the Social-Democrats (yes, Romania is definitely not a good case study of political doctrines!), are also opposing Morar’s second term. Fears of being prosecuted for corruption, as well as the quasi-paranoid assumption that the DNA (and implicitly its leader) is a political tool of President Basescu can be traced as the main roots of these positions.
One should not forget that this discussion takes place only few days after the Commission harshly criticized Romania precisely for the politicization of the justice system and fight against corruption. So, as could be imagined, all this political maneuvering is not at all well seen in Brussels. The Commission is probably remembering the case of Monica Macovei, former Minister of Justice, who was also becoming “uncomfortable” for some parts of the political arena, and therefore had to leave her position, notwithstanding the great appreciation and support she had in Brussels.
A clear sign that the Commission has had enough is the declaration made by the EC spokesman Mark Gray on the topic:
We have seen the comments published by the Romanian media, quoting so-called sources in Brussels, referring to the reconfirmation of Morar as head of DNA. Our position is very clear. We expect the reform process to go forwards, not backwards. We constantly emphasized the good DNA results and the importance of institutional stability in investigating files and in initiating investigations in high-level corruption cases. Reconfirming the chief prosecutor will be a test for the renewed commitments of Romanian authorities
Usually the European Commission does not interfere in questions regarding the staffing policy of Romanian institutions. But they do it in cases where they see that there is a real danger of a deterioration. The intervention will, surely, be criticized by the Social- Democrats and Liberals, as biased and outside the scope of the Commission’s mandate. But the Commission probably realised that its neutral approach leaves too much room for interpretation to Romanian politicians. By putting aside the diplomacy for a moment and calling the facts by their name, the Commission is increasing the pressure on Romania. Controversial as it may seem, this attitude might prove to be the only “mild” weapon the Commission has left before it starts deploying its artillery of sanctions and safeguard clauses.
Written by Anda
How to explain a political process with a video?
The brilliant people at Common Craft just released a great video that explains the US elections in ‘plain English’! If you don’t know their other videos (mostly about internet issues) you really missed something and I strongly recommend them to you. Basically they “make complex ideas easy to understand using short and simple videos.”(mission statement!) But now enjoy “Electing a US President in Plain English”
“Make complex ideas easy to understand” … sounds like the EU needs something like that. Although the EU started experimenting with online videos lately, it still lacks creativity and a certain “online buzz”. Most of the videos about the EU (not only EUtube!) are either pure news reports or have a political motivation. However, one of the greatest problems of the EU is that nobody understands what exactly it does and how it works (which can also explain low turnouts at European elections). Unfortunately EUtube as well as other video producers do not address these issues. Short simple online videos could help people to learn and think about the EU. Maybe the video on US elections can turn into an inspiration to produce similar videos about the European elections or the EU decision making process …in plain 23 languages!
Latest monitoring report on Romania- definitely not the last
Today the European Commission released the monitoring reports on Romania and Bulgaria, foreseen by the “cooperation and verification mechanism”.
On the whole, not many surprises: the rough tone that was expected, telling off the two countries for the very small (if existing) progress regarding judicial reform and fight against corruption. This time, Bulgaria is more severely punished, with part of its funds being suspended. Romania receives yet another warning but still no decisive measure such as the activation of the safeguard clause or retention of European funds.
What is the Commission’s assessment of Romania? In the usual diplomatic slang, the report notes that Romania presents a “mixed picture”. However, it does not take great further reading to realize which are the predominant shades in this “mixed picture”: although Romania seems to have re-established its commitment to judicial reform and the fight against corruption, the “legal and institutional framework is still fragile” and decisions on (especially high level) corruption are highly politicized. Some progress is acknowledged, but so is the lack of political consensus regarding justice reforms.
In conclusion, Romania still has a (rather long) way to go in fulfilling all the benchmarks set at the time of accession and will continue to be closely monitored by the Commission. A crucial element is the political will to fully implement all the commitments made by Romania when joining the EU; and looking at the Romanian political arena at the moment, this does not seem to be a safe bet.
One can almost hear the sigh of relief in the high governmental offices in Bucharest, at the confirmation of the fact that (1) no safeguard clause will be activated, (2) no funds will be suspended, (3) Bulgaria is considered to do worse and is more harshly sanctioned. ‘Schadenfreude’ and relief, that’s all.
Unfortunately. Now they can happily continue their holidays. They “escaped” this time again. This makes me doubt the effects of such a neutral report. Maybe next time the Commission can act more severely. It is sad, but only a “shock therapy” might make the Romanian political class aware of the importance of fulfilling its commitments and not just indulging in the mere satisfaction of doing slightly better than the neighboring country.
Written by Anda
Karadžić arrested, ambassadors back – What next for Serbia?
Serbia’s new government really seems determined about its pro-EU ambitions.
The arrest of war criminal Radovan Karadžić is clearly a political breakthrough, not only for Serbia but also for the entire region as well as a promising sign for EU-Serbia relations. Actually it can be interpreted as a success for the EU foreign policy approach towards Serbia in the last couple of months which consisted of openly supporting pro-EU forces coupled with some small concessions.
So what is behind this bold move of Serbia? Obviously symbols are very important in diplomacy (referring to the discussions about the “pro-EU” government) but I do not think this is purely a short term bit of PR. It is poltics, in a very realist sense of the word. The arrest of a war criminal like Karadžić is a politically risky business. And more importantly, the improvement of relations with the EU and the prospect of getting better contractual relations with the EU seems to be a political priority for the Serbian Government. So it is rather easy: In order to receive any benefits out of the SAA (just consider the economic problems!) they needed to show their willingness to cooperate with the ICTY. If they are serious about their policy priorities they have to deliver. (BTW: The SAA, which was not that easy to get for the Serbian government in the first place, is signed but not implemented, implementation depends on full ICTY compliance.)
What next for Serbia? – Here is the “to do”- list for the Serbian government:
1.) Serbia needs to get the SAA implemented which is in its own interest. However, the arrest of Karadžić might be enough for the time being to prove “full compliance with ICTY” which is a precondition for the SAA implementation. A bit of diplomatic wrangling (especially with Netherlands and Belgium) will be needed but it is possible to get the “full compliance” despite the other missing war criminals.
2.) Arrest Ratko Mladic & Goran Hadzic – Could happen quite soon. Apparently Karadžić was found during a operation that was aimed at Mladic. Of course the success now gives them a bit of extra time to arrest the next one. (I would look for someone with a long beard … just a thought after the arrests of Saddam Hussein and now Karadžić)
3.) Push the Kosovo issue in the background for the time being. Finding a diplomatic formula over the Kosovo issue is obviously the most difficult thing for Serbia, so tactically it is better to get it out of the way. I don’t think a quick solution is likely here. My guess is that this will be one of the political chapters in the EU accession negotiations, so it will be on the agenda in 5 years or so…. Although a final solution can be posponed until the very last moment of the negotiations (maybe with one of those very tense EU summits…), but eventually a Serbian recognition will happen. Plus, the EU will not repeat the Cyprus mistake.
4.) Status of an official EU candidate: Depends a bit on the complex “Lisbon Treaty and Ireland” issue. But I think once the SAA is implemented, the logical next step would be to get the offical status of a EU candidate, maybe next year. We are not talking about EU accession here, not even about opening EU accession negotiations, that is clearly a long term project.
Another interesting (and somewhat overlooked) story is that Serbia’s foreign minister Vuk Jeremic announced plans to reinstate the country’s ambassadors to twenty (!) EU countries that recognized Kosovo’s independence. Belgrade withdrew its ambassadors for “consultations” on Feb 17 following the recognition of Kosovo by the majority of EU countries. So far these plans do not include ambassadors to the US and Japan.
However, another sign that Belgrade has priorities. And the priority, at the moment, is to have better links with the EU. I know it is strange to write and read about “policy coherence” in a Serbian context and that some “election promises” were actually not forgotten and official priorities are treated like priorities… but c’mon why not give them some credit for a remarkable political move !?