Germany was the only NATO/EU member to abstain together Russia, China, Brasil, India. Result: no common EU foreign policy (Ashton being absent from the wider debate anyway) despite the good opportunity for an interesting ESDP mission. The US seems to support the resolution but does not want to use own military capabilities. At the same time there is an agreement between France, the UK and Italy. It is a missed opportunity for ESDP and EU foreign policy in general. And the reason, strangely enough, is Germany. Moreover, Germany is partly to blame why the it took so long to agree on a UN resolution.

(Sorry for the lack of links and background info and the lack of any sophisticated writing, just think of it as a draft blog post – bit in a hurry at the moment…)

So what is the problem with German diplomacy? A quick explanation:

1. There are a couple of important regional elections in the coming weeks. Hugely important for Merkel’s CDU and it does not look very good. Merkel seems to be inspired by Schröder who won elections with swift decisions and a “no war” attitude. So, Merkel’s decision perform a u-turn on nuclear energy (albeit only for 3 months!) and the the “no” to war in Libya seem to follow that idea. However, I think Merkel completely misjudges the situation. The u-turn on nuclear energy lacks any credibility and does not seem to help the CDU (and first opinion polls do support this view). Libya is not Iraq. Libya is quite an easy narrative, and not as controversial as Iraq so you can’t win popular opinion with it. Afghanistan is unpopular, so the idea to do more in Afghanistan and not support the intervention is Libya is counterproductive.

I think the German population would rather support an intervention in Libya than to abstain as the only Western country. Moreover, supporting a UN resolution would not necessarily involve a commitment to military engagement. Germany could have supported the resolution without contributing (citing the real(!) lack of military capabilities). Support: yes, military involvement: no – that would have been a more successful strategy…

Maybe Merkel/Westerwelle were not sure how people would react to an involvement of the Bundeswehr – or even to a formal endorsement of the intervention in Libya. However, judging on trends in popular opinion at the moment it is easy to come to the conclusion that any controversial decision (i.e intervention) could become a hot issue in German politics.  The prospect of defending a war in the three upcoming election campaigns might have been a contributing factor that explains the German position.

2. Foreign Minister Westerwelle is not up to the job. He lacks the political feeling for situations, foreign policy is not really his field of expertise. He often seems uncomfortable with foreign policy. After the elections he should have taken over the ministry of finance and/or economics. And he is the most unpopular foreign minister ever. In Germany, Foreign ministers are always among the most trusted and popular politicians – with the exception of Westerwelle. Is Libya an attempt to become popular again? Oh, and it seems that the Chancellery is the main foreign policy player at the moment. So, the abstention could be a sign of the internal problems of German foreign policy, a disagreement between Merkel and Westerwelle is quite likely.

3. “No war” as a foreign policy principle. Not very convincing after Kosovo & Afghanistan but it might have some influence in the thinking on foreign policy among German diplomats. Especially the rather bad experiences in Afghanistan might have shaped the “no intervention” stance of the German government. A more serious point is that German decision makers are convinced that this “no fly zone” will basically result in a war which might last for quite some time. And nobody in Germany wants to send soldiers on Libyan soil. Not only is it unpopular, there are quite some risks attached to it.  Especially after  Afghanistan and  Iraq the danger of a getting into a conflict that last for several years should not be underestimated. Moreover, there has been very little talk about what constitutes a “success” of the intervention. German decision makers are naturally reluctant without having a clear exit strategy and general strategy what to do after the air strikes! I think these ideas are crucial in understanding the German position.

A last chance for German diplomacy?

The Libyan government just announced a ceasefire (a real chance or Gaddafi trying to buy time?). If implemented (which is doubtful anyway) there might be some negotiations about the future of Libya. Maybe a mediation to discuss an acceptable exit strategy for Gaddafi or some power sharing mechanisms; there might be a UN backed peacekeeping force – everything in flux as Gaddafi seems to be determined to stay in power as long as possible. So, any diplomatic negotiations will mostly happen in the background. Germany could be seen as the only ‘credible western country’ to negotiate between the Libyan government and the opposition/international community. If the German government wants to restore trust and credibility it might a good idea to get involved now. However, it is probably not very likely to happen…not with Westerwelle and Merkel.

Update: Germany rejects Libya ceasefire monitoring role

However, despite all the talk about the European Council President, this is actually the more important position for one single reason:  The High Rep will be able to use the EU foreign policy machinery including (post EEAS) – Commission staff (RELEX), Council Secretariat staff (including ESDP and CFSP tools plus all the  ‘Special Representatives’) and the newly created European External Action Service.

Moreover the new High Rep will be a Vice-President of the European Commission and chair the Foreign Affairs Councils. Therefore I agree with Simon Hix who said “The president could end up being all prestige and no power, while the high representative is real power and little prestige.” The European Council President only chairs a couple of summits and has no job description – it is not even clear whether he will get office staff… Well, one sentence in the Lisbon treaty could  become problematic:

It is the Council President (President of the European Council) who will “ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy”. He shall do that, however: “without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”.

So, team play will be necessary at least to a certain extent. However, it is very unfortunate that the question of who becomes High Rep depends on who will be chosen as European Council President – and not the other way round!

So let’s have a quick round of possible candidates:

Today, speculations included David Miliband (UK Foreign Secretary -ruled himself out on twitter!), frequently mentioned is also Olli Rehn (EU enlargement commissioner) as well as Ursula Plassnik (former Foreign Minister of Austria) and Dora Bakoyannis (former Foreign Minister of Greece). Several other names have been mentioned in the last couple of months: former External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten, former Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel and former NATO Secretary-General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer.

Anyone in there who could be the next High Rep? I think David Miliband could be a good candidate but he might not be experienced enough – and, given his ambition to become the next leader of the Labour party, I doubt whether he is a serious candidate. Let’s ask him in 5 years again!  What about the rest? They all seem rather boring with a lack vision for EU foreign policy. Unfortunately I do not know much about Ursula Plassnik  and Dora Bakoyannis. Chris Patten and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer are certainly well respected in Brussels.  Especially Jaap de Hoop Scheffer could be a serious candidate given his NATO experience – he would be a solid and diplomatic High Rep without being too demanding towards member states.  Olli Rehn lacks experience and being EU enlargement Commissioner may not be enough to get the job. However, a High Rep without political ambition (de Hoop Scheffer) or lack of experience (Rehn) could exactly be the sort of person the European Council is looking for…

But is that everything we can come up with?  The High Rep should be THE foreign policy authority of the EU, with the ability to negotiate deals in the Foreign Affairs Council  – so the person needs to be high profile and should have considerable foreign policy experience.  European Foreign Policy is one policy in which citizens want to see a stronger EU. The new High Rep needs to be able to communicate this clearly and passionately. Moreover, the person is expected to negotiate worldwide – so there we need someone recognizable with a proven track record in international negotiation. (If Tony Blair was serious about a EU job – he should go for that one and not the one with prestige and the misleading title).  So who else could be doing this kind of job:

Joschka Fischer – a former German foreign minister. He would certainly tick all the boxes. He has huge foreign policy experience, is known internationally and with good connections in the Middle East and in the US (after being a Visiting Fellow at Princeton and working in Madeleine Albright’s consultancy). Recently, he started working in support of the Nabucco pipeline. He has been a very charismatic and popular politician – and can still fill conference centres in London, Brussels or Washington! He would certainly be able to give the EU a real voice in foreign affairs. That unfortunately rules him out -  exactly that is not wanted by our dear politicians.

Martti Ahtisaari – a former president of Finland.  Wouldn’t it be great if Obama and Athisaari met and the press could have a headline like “Two Nobel peace prize winners demand…” – certainly Ahtisaari is very knowledgeable and respected internationally. He has an excellent reputation as a conflict mediator (he got the Nobel peace price for that!) and  has been an active advocate of a more powerful EU foreign policy. Again not the best thing to do in the present political climate. He might lack a bit of charisma (compared to Fischer…) which could be seen as an asset by the European Council…

Carl Bildt – the current Swedish foreign minister. Another strong candidate judging on his vast foreign policy experience. He is the only serving foreign minister of all the candidates which is an advantage because connections are important!  However, some (France, Germany) often claim he is too outspoken on Russia. He is a well known blogger and often grabs media attention with some bold statements. Moreover, being in the spotlight of EU politics due to the Swedish Council Presidency might be helpful (although the bold statement could ruin it…).

So, who has realistic chances? At the moment the race seems very open (or the secret is being kept well…) – Jaap de Hoop Sheffer, Chris Patten and  Olli Rehn could be realistic candidates, the joker could be Carl Bildt. Chances are that we get someone that has not been subject of any rumours lately. (The French are suspiciously silent…) And obviously it always depends a lot on who will become European Council President in terms of political and geographical balance…

But one thing is certain: unfortunately the best candidates will have absolutely no chance of getting the job!