Category Archives: International Politics

Lessons in diplomatic rhetoric

Foreign policy is all about language. Everyone seems to enjoy these carefully constructed sophisticated statements full of poetic brillance and subtle references mixed with highly complex and technical terms which usually hide the fact that the substance is rather slim. If you got lost there here is an example:
If you are a small country you probably ”punch above your weight” and if you are not on the “axis of evil” you are probably  “one of our closest and strongest allies”. Learn from the master of political rhetoric:

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What diplomats say and what they mean – Diplomatic terminology for dummies

Everything you need to know about diplomacy. I just found a hilarious one pager on “Terms used in multilateral negotiations and what they usually mean” – In fact I found it in my cupboard in a file that is 5-6 years old. After some googeling I found a very similar version in a 2009 book called “The Weak Send Rocks, The Strong Send Rockets (affiliate – link)” – although this is not the original source I have embedded the chapter below (which according to the author is “unprotected from copyright”). If you work in EU politics or indeed any diplomatic environment you will recognise most of the terms… and you might even agree with the various “explanations”… Continue reading

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German diplomacy on Libya: A quick explanation

Why did Germany abstain at the United Nations?

Germany was the only NATO/EU member to abstain together Russia, China, Brasil, India. Result: no common EU foreign policy (Ashton being absent from the wider debate anyway) despite the good opportunity for an interesting ESDP mission. The US seems to support the resolution but does not want to use own military capabilities. At the same time there is an agreement between France, the UK and Italy. It is a missed opportunity for ESDP and EU foreign policy in general. And the reason, strangely enough, is Germany. Moreover, Germany is partly to blame why the it took so long to agree on a UN resolution.

(Sorry for the lack of links and background info and the lack of any sophisticated writing, just think of it as a draft blog post – bit in a hurry at the moment…)

So what is the problem with German diplomacy? A quick explanation:

1. There are a couple of important regional elections in the coming weeks. Hugely important for Merkel’s CDU and it does not look very good. Merkel seems to be inspired by Schröder who won elections with swift decisions and a “no war” attitude. So, Merkel’s decision perform a u-turn on nuclear energy (albeit only for 3 months!) and the the “no” to war in Libya seem to follow that idea. However, I think Merkel completely misjudges the situation. The u-turn on nuclear energy lacks any credibility and does not seem to help the CDU (and first opinion polls do support this view). Libya is not Iraq. Libya is quite an easy narrative, and not as controversial as Iraq so you can’t win popular opinion with it. Afghanistan is unpopular, so the idea to do more in Afghanistan and not support the intervention is Libya is counterproductive.

I think the German population would rather support an intervention in Libya than to abstain as the only Western country. Moreover, supporting a UN resolution would not necessarily involve a commitment to military engagement. Germany could have supported the resolution without contributing (citing the real(!) lack of military capabilities). Support: yes, military involvement: no – that would have been a more successful strategy…

Maybe Merkel/Westerwelle were not sure how people would react to an involvement of the Bundeswehr – or even to a formal endorsement of the intervention in Libya. However, judging on trends in popular opinion at the moment it is easy to come to the conclusion that any controversial decision (i.e intervention) could become a hot issue in German politics.  The prospect of defending a war in the three upcoming election campaigns might have been a contributing factor that explains the German position.

2. Foreign Minister Westerwelle is not up to the job. He lacks the political feeling for situations, foreign policy is not really his field of expertise. He often seems uncomfortable with foreign policy. After the elections he should have taken over the ministry of finance and/or economics. And he is the most unpopular foreign minister ever. In Germany, Foreign ministers are always among the most trusted and popular politicians – with the exception of Westerwelle. Is Libya an attempt to become popular again? Oh, and it seems that the Chancellery is the main foreign policy player at the moment. So, the abstention could be a sign of the internal problems of German foreign policy, a disagreement between Merkel and Westerwelle is quite likely.

3. “No war” as a foreign policy principle. Not very convincing after Kosovo & Afghanistan but it might have some influence in the thinking on foreign policy among German diplomats. Especially the rather bad experiences in Afghanistan might have shaped the “no intervention” stance of the German government. A more serious point is that German decision makers are convinced that this “no fly zone” will basically result in a war which might last for quite some time. And nobody in Germany wants to send soldiers on Libyan soil. Not only is it unpopular, there are quite some risks attached to it.  Especially after  Afghanistan and  Iraq the danger of a getting into a conflict that last for several years should not be underestimated. Moreover, there has been very little talk about what constitutes a “success” of the intervention. German decision makers are naturally reluctant without having a clear exit strategy and general strategy what to do after the air strikes! I think these ideas are crucial in understanding the German position.

A last chance for German diplomacy?

The Libyan government just announced a ceasefire (a real chance or Gaddafi trying to buy time?). If implemented (which is doubtful anyway) there might be some negotiations about the future of Libya. Maybe a mediation to discuss an acceptable exit strategy for Gaddafi or some power sharing mechanisms; there might be a UN backed peacekeeping force – everything in flux as Gaddafi seems to be determined to stay in power as long as possible. So, any diplomatic negotiations will mostly happen in the background. Germany could be seen as the only ‘credible western country’ to negotiate between the Libyan government and the opposition/international community. If the German government wants to restore trust and credibility it might a good idea to get involved now. However, it is probably not very likely to happen…not with Westerwelle and Merkel.

Update: Germany rejects Libya ceasefire monitoring role

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OpenLeaks leaks

And the story of OpenLeaks begins… with a leak of the website content. You could not make it up. Probably the website will go live rather soon. Anyway,  check it out if you can’t wait anymore. It is a good summary of what openleaks is about, what it intends to do and how it differs from wikileaks.

Update: Technically it is not a leak at all as the content is freely available on the OpenLeaks server, it is not password protected and not linked to the main page (the link is also provided in the pdf file) (via netzpolitik)

If you want to read more about openleaks also have a look at this  interesting interview with Daniel Domscheit-Berg over  at techpresident. Daniel also gave a presentation on openleaks at  27C3 in December 2010:

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Kosmolinks #20: WikiLeaks

Kosmolinks returns with a selection of the best wikileaks/cablegate articles/links. (see my initial reaction on cablegate/wikileaks here and some links to Julian Assange’s writings here). The in aim in this post is not to provide an overview about the mainstream media coverage  but to highlight a few interesting articles and links that I found helpful in thinking about wikileaks.

Memex 1.1 » What the attacks on WikiLeaks tell us.

Wikileaks, Now « zunguzungu

WL Central- An unofficial WikiLeaks information resource

Reporters Sans Frontières – Wikileaks hounded?

A list of Wikileaks Mirrors and a guide how to support Mass Mirroring

Raffi Khatchadourian: No Secrets Julian Assange’s mission for total transparency (The New Yorker)

Like It or Not, WikiLeaks is a Media Entity (gigaom.com)

The Weakest Link: What Wikileaks Has Taught Us About the Open Internet | an/archivista

Glenn Greenwald – Salon.com

Kontrapunkt: Schafft zwei, drei, viele Wikileaks! – Meinung – Tagesspiegel

List of people who have criminalised Julian Assange

PdFLeaks: Carne Ross on the Diplomacy Before and After Wikileaks | techPresident

PdF Presents: A Symposium on Wikileaks and Internet Freedom | Personal Democracy Forum

From Wikileaks to OpenLeaks, Via the Knight News Challenge | techPresident

Richard Stallman Kettling Wikileaks | DefectiveByDesign.org

WikiLeaks has created a new media landscape | Clay Shirky | Comment is free | The Guardian.

The age of the WikiLeaks-style vigilante geek is over | Evgeny Morozov | The Guardian.

[FYI: This linkroll will be updated regularly - so if you are interested in the topic make sure to check back from time to time. ]

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Julian Assange: Essays on conspiracies

The media is all over wikileaks and cablegate. But, as usual, they might miss an important part of the story. There seems little understanding about what exactly wikileaks stands for and where it comes from. A good start is to read Julian Assange’s archived blog “Interesting Questions” which he wrote between 2006-2007.

If you want to understand Julian Assange I recommend to read his essay “conspiracy as governance” in which he explains his world-view and provides some sort of  philosophical underpinnings for wikileaks.

For example, Assange writes about the non linear effects of leaks on unjust systems of governance:

The more secretive or unjust an organization is, the more leaks induce fear and paranoia in its leadership and planning coterie. This must result in minimization of efficient internal communications mechanisms (an increase in cognitive “secrecy tax”) and consequent system-wide cognitive decline resulting in decreased ability to hold onto power as the environment demands adaption.

Hence in a world where leaking is easy, secretive or unjust systems are nonlinearly hit relative to open, just systems. Since unjust systems, by their nature induce opponents, and in many places barely have the upper hand, mass leaking leaves them exquisitely vulnerable to those who seek to replace them with more open forms of  governance.

Only revealed injustice can be answered; for man to do anything intelligent he has to know what’s actually going on.

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Between gossip and intelligence: Some thoughts on #cablegate and wikileaks

Once again, wikileaks managed to grab the attention of the world media. They started publishing 251,287 United States  cables  sent from, or to, US embassies around the world. They named it Cablegate and indeed it is a unprecedented leak of diplomatic material. Some initial thoughts (written at 3 am – sorry for the typos and the unfinished arguments) :

  • We don’t know enough. So far wikileaks published 220 out of 251287 diplomatic cables. Wikileaks announced that they would release cables in stages over the next few months. They learnt a lesson how to keep the media interested. Remember the Daily Telegraph and the expense scandal in the UK? They published something every couple of days – which made it much more damaging and created a huge political scandal. So, I guess we need to wait and see what else will happen. According to wikileaks the cables can be broadly labelled as follows.
  • 15, 652 secret
  • 101,748 confidential
  • 133,887 unclassified
  • Iraq most discussed country – 15,365 (Cables coming from Iraq – 6,677)
  • Ankara, Turkey had most cables coming from it – 7,918
  • From Secretary of State office – 8,017
  • Wikileaks continues with its model to work with a couple of selected media outlets.  Spiegel, The Guardian, El Pais, Le Monde,  The New York Times (via the Guardian)  got access to the files after signing an agreement of confidentiality. Not sure what the role of owni.fr is – they seem to provide tools but did not have access to the files.   Some might criticise that because many other journalists do not have the opportunity to analyse the data thoroughly prior to publication. However, wikileaks learnt that without such a process most files will go unnoticed and much of the momentum gets lost. At the same time it is quite a good business model as it guarantees mainstream media a degree of exclusivity – something the wikileaks team members announced already a year ago. Wikileaks need the mainstream media to be successful – and the mainstream media only need wikileaks if they can get some exclusive rights. (Personally, I think wikileaks should return to a more collaborative and participatory approach instead of focusing on high profile and “event like” leaks…)
  • There are – as usual- too many pundits that claim that they know the implications of the leak already. The newspapers will focus on the “funny” headlines how diplomats describe certain politicians etc. I doubt that many will actually put cables in context and try to explain why they were written.  It is also important to note that although a certain ambassador might be ‘quoted’, the cable was written by other policy analysts that work in political reporting. The ambassador might have not even read the report! As far as I can see it there are no “top secret” cables which makes it even more likely that most of the content was routine stuff.  Anyway, to get a basic idea about the cables, the most important article you should read is by Simon Jenkins in the Guardian who not only states  that “the job of the media is not to protect the powerful from embarrassment” – but more importantly he highlights a crucial fact that most commentators will fail to report:

The state department knew of the leak several months ago and had ample time to alert staff in sensitive locations. Its pre-emptive scaremongering over the weekend stupidly contrived to hint at material not in fact being published. Nor is the material classified top secret, being at a level that more than 3 million US government employees are cleared to see, and available on the defence department’s internal Siprnet. Such dissemination of “secrets” might be thought reckless, suggesting a diplomatic outreach that makes the British empire seem minuscule.

The revelations do not have the startling, coldblooded immediacy of the WikiLeaks war logs from Iraq and Afghanistan, with their astonishing insight into the minds of fighting men seemingly detached from the ethics of war. The disclosures are largely of analysis and high-grade gossip. Insofar as they are sensational, it is in showing the corruption and mendacity of those in power, and the mismatch between what they claim and what they do.

  • The most striking implication is the likely transformation of diplomacy. Diplomacy changed over the years but it never experienced radical change. The system always relied on written and unwritten rules of secrecy. Moreover, “traditional political reporting” assumes that only staff in a particular city are able to gather facts of the political situation in this country. This also includes newspaper summaries – and  many policy officers do rely on media reports. Well, somehow diplomacy  is still the same system as several hundred years ago – with the exception that cables are now electronic. But it is obvious that “cablegate” would have not happened if diplomats still communicated with letters. Diplomacy entered the 21st century! Generally, diplomats must develop a better understanding of the internet.
  • It is not a US problem. It can happen to every service everywhere. We live in a age of information and it is inevitable that these things happen. At the same time, diplomacy and foreign policy need to become more accountable. As long as diplomats do not learn from previous mistakes, as long as they behave as if they can act in a small secret bubble, as long as they think they can get away with everything -  these leaks will continue and indeed help to bring transparency to international politics.
  • An unindented consequence might be how the internet is perceived by decision makers. Concerns of privacy and transparency might become a greater issue in the future. Surely, diplomatic services around the world will tighten their intranets and take IT guys more seriously.  But again,  there is always a human factor involved in leaks. As soon as people have access to a network of information leaks are possible!
  • “Cablegate” represents a demystification of diplomacy and foreign policy. We get a first hand account of how embassies work and that political reporting is in fact done by human beings. The problem is that some private conversations will now be in the newspapers which can be a problem for some people. Obviously there will some sensitive material which will result in major political scandals. A taster for this kind of information are the revelations of  misbehaviour of US diplomats at the UN headquarters  as well as  signs of corruption in US aid programmes. However, the implications might be more problematic for autocratic and dictatorial regimes as they often act differently in international diplomacy than they do “at home” (in regards to Iran for example). The cables about the thinking of Arab leaders regarding Iran seems to be the most interesting revelation so far. Especially in these cases a more honest and transparent diplomacy might be the result! In countries like Germany or the UK most cables could have been written by an average political analyst (or blogger!).  So far, most cables correspond with the mainstream analysis of US foreign policy (and indeed domestic politics!). However, it will be interesting to compare media reporting in different countries.
  • And last but not least. What about the EU? There is category for the US mission to the EU and a EU search tag. There are some mentions of the EU in cables from the several US embassies in Berlin, London, Paris and Rome. Not sure whether we will see a lot of revelations there.  MEP Marietje Schaake asked the European Commission a couple of questions regarding the leaks here. And the answers are here. Not surprisingly, and now confirmed by Der Spiegel, we learnt that Obama has “no emotional relationship with Europe,” and that he prefers to focus  on Asia instead. However, the most interesting case to follow could well be the 7,918 cables from Turkey.

To be continued…

 

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ACTA Recommendation: Ditch the Crazy Stuff

Here is a short ACTA explanation in “plain English” by Public Knowledge’s Legal Director Harold Feld. Five minutes with Harold Feld – because this stuff is important – and you need to know.

Oh, and this is not only a matter for the US, in fact the EU has been quite active in the negotiations about the ACTA agreement. If you want to know more read Michael Geist’s blog who published a series of very useful posts on ACTA.

The most important thing is that there will be another negotiation round in Lucerne/Switzerland next week! Check out La Quadrature du Net and the campaign how you can help to  Stop ACTA!

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Apply for TH!NK3 – Millennium Development Goals

The third edition of Th!nk about it has been announced. It is a blogging competition run by the European Journalism Centre which will focus on on the developing world and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG):

The competition will bring together journalists, journalism students, academics and experts from 27 EU Member States, neighbourhood countries and beyond, to write about global cooperation in international development. TH!NK3: Developing World will run from 24 March, 2010 to 31 August, 2010.

If you want to participate, just apply here! Since I was involved in the project last year I can assure you that Th!nk  is a lot of fun and an amazing learning experience.  You can also have a look at the previous rounds that focused on the European Parliament elections and climate change.

Here is the official trailer for TH!NK3:

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