While the interinstitutional decision-making process is making headlines (of course, depending on the topic), the internal decision-making mechanism within each EU institution is somewhat more obscure to the general public. Nevertheless, the internal workings of the institutions do influence a lot the overall EU policy making. The European Commission, with its right of initiative, is placed at the very beginning (and thus also at the core) of this process. This is where all the policy proposals originate, making it interesting to look into how they are drafted and decided upon.

First of all, we have to be clear: a policy proposal is not a mere document; it is a file that contains, beside the legislative act, a memorandum explaining the context of the decision, the results of the impact assessments and ex-ante evaluations that need to conducted, financial information, the results of the inter-service consultation, a draft press release as well as, yes, you are reading correctly, a “citizen summary” (an explanation of the decision in more accessible terms than the usual jargon). This file has to be prepared, involving formal and informal internal coordination procedures as well as the consultation of external stakeholders. All this needs to be done at this very early preparatory stage. And then there is the translation. Only after the file is complete can it go further, to the level of Heads of Cabinet. They prepare the agenda of the College meeting, by thoroughly analysing all the files at hand and trying to reach consensus in order to pave the way towards a swift adoption.

The type of procedure used for adopting a file is determined by the degree of consensus already reached at the inter-service consultation level and at the level of Heads of Cabinet.

• the oral procedure is used for the files that require a debate of the College of Commissioners; the documents concerned are usually of a more political and controversial nature and there might have been disagreements among the services concerned. The College meeting takes place every Wednesday and is prepared by the meeting of the Heads of Cabinet (the so called “Hebdo”) taking place on Mondays. The files adopted through oral procedure are the ones that stand out and attract media coverage. However, it is interesting to note, that they represent a very small percentage of the total number of Commission decisions. For example, in 2009 alone, only 215 files went through oral procedure, compared to 3129 adopted by written procedure.  Most of the oral procedure decisions are in the fields of Economic and Financial Affairs and Competition.
• the written procedure is used when all the services concerned agree and a College debate is not necessary; the file is submitted to all the Commissioners and is deemed to be adopted if none of them has any reservations before the deadline. The idea behind using this procedure is to take away some of the burden of debating files without major political interest. The number of files going through this procedure has been around 3000 each year, in the last 10 years. The written procedure is mainly used in fields like Health and Consumer Protection, Agriculture, External aid and Enterprise.
• the  empowerment procedure consists of a mandate given by the College in its meeting to one or several of its members to take measures in its name and under its responsibility, within strict limits and conditions; it is used for clearly defined management and administrative acts. After being by far the most used procedure before 2003, in the years thereafter the number of files going though this procedure ranged between 2000 and 3000 per year, with 2247 having adopted in 2009. The fields where empowerment is mostly used are Competition, Regional policy and Agriculture.
• the delegation procedure was introduced in 2003 and took away part of the file load previously decided by empowerment. The interesting thing about it is that the decisions are no longer adopted by the College as a whole or even by an empowered Commissioner; in the case of the delegation procedure, the Commission gives a mandate to a Director General or Head of Service to act in its name. This procedure is usually used for technical matters, very well regulated and where the margin of discretion is strictly limited. However, when we look at the numbers, something is quite striking: since 2003, there were on average 4000 files adopted every year through delegation (with around 4500 in 2009), making it the most used internal decision-making method of the Commission.

The policy preparation process within the Commission is a rather complex process, most of the time taking place outside the limelight. A thorough coordination amongst all services is required, which takes place both informally (e.g.meetings of thematic inter-service groups, written inter-departmental consultation, etc) and formally (the Inter-service consultation procedure, where all services must give their opinion on a certain file within a set deadline- usually 10 days and 15 days if the file has more than 20 pages). This process has an impact on the method used for adopting the decision. Something that should not be ignored is the fact that the Commission also has to consult externally, which it does through Green Papers, White Papers, expert groups meetings, etc. An impact assessment on the economic, social and environmental consequences of a proposal needs to be conducted for all major policy initiatives and legislative proposals. There is, thus, scope for the various stakeholders to interact with the Commission at this very early stage and action during the preparation stage is usually the most successful in terms of influence over policy-making.

An interesting observation can be made by looking into the various internal decision-making methods: what we usually read in the media as Commission proposals is just the tip of the iceberg- the few files that go through oral procedure every year- accounting for about 2,5% of the approximately 10000 acts adopted yearly by the Commission. The core of Commission activity rests with adopting mainly technical and administrative acts, without much political weight and thus being delegated to the bureaucratic levels of the Commission. It is a clear proof of its technocratic character that does, by no means, undermine its image as policy initiator, but puts its activity in a more balanced light.

Now, of course, no one would blame you for not knowing this. You might even pass a concours and start working for the EU institutions, completely ignoring its existence. But just in case you come across it and want to show off with your EU knowledge, here are a few facts about the finalisation written procedure. You may be aware that the Commission takes decisions either by oral procedure, written procedure, empowerment or delegation. But what if a file starts as an oral procedure and ends up in a written procedure? And in what circumstances does this happen?

The Commission’s most visible activity consists of the decisions coming out of the weekly College meeting. These are the issues that are decided using the oral procedure and are usually the ones with a big political weight or/ and that have stirred controversy already at the stage of inter-service consultation (the earliest step in policy preparation). But there is always a limit to the  issues that can actually be discussed at the College meeting and that can thus make top headlines at the press conference thereafter.

This is the main reason behind the more and more frequent use of the finalisation written procedure. According to this procedure, the Heads of Cabinets (at their weekly meeting on Mondays) or the Commissioners, at their Wednesday meeting, can decide to switch some items initially assigned to the oral procedure to being decided through the written procedure. Thus, the decisions can be taken after the College meeting (usually Thursdays), allowing the Commissioners to focus on the most important and controversial issues and, at the same time, being likely to attract media attention that they might have missed by being just a part of a busy Wednesday agenda. Smart move…

Simon Hix on The State of European Democracy After Lisbon at the IIEA – The Institute of International and European Affairs.

Estonian Euro coins? No, it is the upcoming  Belgian Council presidency – at least this is the characterisation of  senior Belgian officials. As we are approaching its start, on July 1st, everyone is eager to hear about the famous presidency priorities. The fact that nowadays there is a set of common priorities for the 18 months trio presidency seems to be forgotten, by both the great public and, strangely, sometimes even by the respective countries. Every country still seems to have its own agenda, or at least it is expected to.

Belgium, however, is in a rather awkward, not enviable position right now. Not only does it have to deal with the Euro crisis, while trying to implement the institutional changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty, it is also facing yet again an internal political crisis with the government’s resignation in late April and elections scheduled on June 13th, merely two weeks before the beginning of the Presidency. Furthermore (as if all this alone was not enough), Belgium has one of the most complex federal systems, with three government levels with various (exclusive and shared) fields of competencies. A miniature EU, one might dare to say. This could mean good news: since it has developed a rather complicated but still quite manageable system at home, Belgium must have enough experience to steer the EU in all its changing (and challenging) complexity. But it could also mean bad news, when misfortune strikes both in its own backyard and beyond it. And this seems to be the current situation.

So what are the Belgian presidency’s priorities? Well, this is quite a “tricky” topic, seeing all the above reasons and baring in mind the expectations, the much talked about “need for leadership”, combined with the rather unclear EU representation responsibility envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty. No diplomatic effort is spared to convey the message that the 2010 Belgian presidency will be rather low key, “sober, plain and simple”. Not much of an own agenda (we do have the agenda of the Trio Presidency, remember?), not much visibility (we do have a permanent President of the European Council- which happens to be a Belgian- and a High Representative for Foreign Affairs); and probably a weaker authority, due to internal political instability.

In practical terms, the Presidency will probably not suffer a great deal from the domestic struggles. Even if a new government will not be in place by July 1st (which will probablybe the case), the current government will act as a caretaker and will start the Presidency. Later on, if a new government will be formed during the 6 months, it will take over and, of course, this will mean a change at the level of ministerial representation. However, in practice, this is not as bad and destabilising as it seems. Luckily, as I mentioned before, the Belgian system is complex enough to ensure that things keep working in times of political instability. Due to its federal nature, the representation in the Council is shared between the various levels (federal, regions and communities), depending on the topic. The system is very well organised and for the shared competences a rotation mechanism is put into place whereby the various regions, communities and the federal level succeed each other in chairing the respective Council formations. So well thought through, that even when one piece of the puzzle is missing (in this case a federal government) business as usual continues. The downside of this power-sharing mechanism is that if the various stakeholders disagree on a certain topic, Belgium is bound to be silent in the EU arena. It happened before (see the “Service directive”) and it might prove to be problematic if it happens during the Belgian presidency.

The focus on action and output, instead of a long list of priorities that might all be turned upside down by surprise events (Belgium was holding its last EU Presidency when the 9/11 events took place) is commendable. It is, nevertheless, questionable whether what Europe needs right now is a voiceless, low key leader, adopting an “ostrich strategy”. We can only hope that, if not a memorable Presidency (like some of the previous Belgian ones), the upcoming 6 months can prove that the Belgian model of  functioning without a government for fairly long periods of time without the day to day life of its citizens being directly affected can be successfully copy-pasted at EU level. It is, by no means the visionary approach on EU integration of the EU’s founding fathers, but in the current situation we would probably be better off with the least harm.

Last week an interesting memo leaked from William Hague who is now the new British Foreign Secretary:

The Tory letter on Europe in full.

There is also a section in coalition agreement titled”Relations with the EU”:

Coalition Negotiations Agreement

Just a short comment:

A lot of no’s and red lines. A referendum lock on any new EU treaty (ok, nothing is in the pipeline at the moment..) or “if sovereignty is transfered” (whatever that means…).  It is a nice gesture to include the idea of  “one seat for the EP” – but it is not likely to happen (just ask any French minister…). And that the UK will not introduce the Euro in the next 5 years is also not a surprise (Maastricht criteria anyone?). Everything is very vague – probably to please the anti-EU Tories as well as the pro-EU LibDems. It is disappointing that there is no positive idea, no willingness to engage creatively, no project that the UK government wants to push forward. Some innovative climate change legislation maybe, completing the single market, an increased cooperation in defense matters (St.Malo was a good start!)  or even a CAP reform (and the British rebate is a great bargaining chip!)…there are quite some possibilities without any ‘sovereignty issues’ attached.

Unfortunately, William Hague, the new Foreign Secretary, is a convinced  anti-EU politician. Usually he is an outspoken euroskeptic who has been instrumental for numerous Conservative/euroskeptic policies and ideas. One example is the infamous post-ratification referendum.

On  a more positive note, David Lidington, a moderate Tory, was appointed as the new Europe minister. In the early 1990s he supported John Major’s backing of the Maastricht Treaty . Interestingly, the former “shadow Europe minister”  Mark Francois did not get the job.  He is another hard-line euroskeptic who was behind the Tory idea of leaving the EPP group in the European Parliament. (thanks to GGBrunt for the clarification)

Nick Clegg, the deputy PM, and most of the LibDems in the newly formed cabinet are amongst the most pro-EU politicians in the UK.  Kenneth Clarke, the (only?) pro-EU Tory in the cabinet became Justice Secretary and Lord Chancellor, which is a good position for him to deal with or veto the most radical  ‘power repatriation’ ideas of the Conservative Party. The cabinet is indeed an interesting mixture and we have to wait how it develops.

David Cameron, the new Prime Minister, strikes me as very pragmatic. At the moment I think he will not do anything radical because it will be difficult to keep the LibDems happy if he follows the euroskeptic wing of his party. Even before he came to power he ditched the idea of having a post-ratification referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon. I think he is quite realistic what he can achieve with the coalition and what not.We might see some more parliamentary scrutiny and possibly some more opt-outs. I don’t think anything will be successful that involves opt-out from existing agreements that would need the consensus of the other 26 EU states. I think he knows that and he deliberately has been very vague when it comes to details. He does seem to recognize that the topic might develop into a major problem for the coalition.

At the same time we should not expect any great initiative coming from Downing Street in the next years. Unfortunately  Britain is likely to keep a distance to the  EU  and we will definitely get a more ‘radical’ rhetoric from the government – especially from William Hague.

What did the Belgian daily De Standaard write when the Treaty of Rome was adopted?

This could be something important…

And another classic EU quote:

there are two categories of countries: the small ones and the ones that do not realise that they are small (Max Kohstamm)

Let’s start with the EU foreign policy basics.

Other continents play chess, the EU plays ping pong…

… working without strategy has its merits but time is changing and it does not work anymore…

EU integration can then be defined as a “method of not having a strategy”

About the EEAS:

It looks like a Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is organised as a MFA, it works like a MFA but it is not called MFA? Well, it is still a MFA!

The future:

Did we learn the lessons to deal with “future Afghanistans”?

Enlargement has been one of the most defining characteristics of EU integration:

Enlargement a EU foreign policy tool?  No: enlargement is enlargement.  Foreign policy is foreign policy.

But remember:

EU enlargement can also happen by splitting up member states….

So, what is the European Union?

A super-Switzerland

EU geek fact of the day:

There are 19 references to the UN in the EU Treaties.

A universal quote for every decision maker:

I fully understand that political decisions are time consuming, but…

EU in 2010:

It has been a very bad year for the European Community: it was totally replaced by the European Union

If you need a good name for a committee you are about to set up what about:

EGFA = Expert Group for Further Action

Some quotes by José Manuel Barroso (the keynote speaker) who  does not like “the intellectual glamor of pessimism”:

this academic conference reminds me of the time when I still had the time for reflection.

EU is not a federal state. Comparisons with federal states will be disappointing. Good results if compared to international organisations  or other regions regions

We are a non-imperial empire.

Realists are wrong most of the time. Realism is the closest thing to cynicism.

If Europe does not get more united it gets more dis-united.

Foreign policy starts at home.

I quote the Lisbon treaty because I believe that the Member States have read it before they signed it…

The EU interest is more than the sum of the national interests.

The video is based on a German zensursula video. The producer of the video made several videos that became famous in the German debate on internet freedom etc. Do check out  http://alexanderlehmann.net/ for more videos!

Dear Cecila Malmstöm, back off from the Internet, Commissioner . (via netzpolitik.org)

For more details do read this European Voice article and have a look at this leaked Council document “Draft Council Conclusions on an Action Plan to implement the Concerted Strategy to combat cybercrime” and the CIRCAMP project.

Obviously, we don’t know the exact reasons but resigning from a job can mean two things. Either you don’t like the job anymore or your boss encourages you to look for something else. Now if you resign after only a couple of months, the job is either really really annoying – or you just got fired. The good thing with working for the European institutions is that you cannot really be sacked but it is possible to change positions…

Being quite diplomatic, Lutz Güllner explained his resignation: “I have decided to step down because I see my professional future in DG trade.”

Now, Catherine Ashton has had quite a difficult time in the last months. Whatever she did was wrong – especially in the eyes of the media. There have been a number of indiscreet leaks to the press about her family life and her not being able to do the job. As I said before: I don’t believe that journalists make up everything, they have their sources and the sources know what the journalists like to hear… I am not saying that Güllner is behind it but as a spokesperson he might have not reacted appropriately (at least from Ashton’s perspective). And we should not forget he is responsible for media relations… Spokespersons (also in national contexts) often quit and usually it has something to do with bad publicity in the media.

After all, it is not a surprise that Ashton wants to make sure that she can trust her team. Especially after everything that has happened in the last weeks. But the media only seems to be interested in criticising her. The Independent interpreted the resignation as a “a fresh blow to her reputation”. The BBC correspondent thinks that it will “be another blow to the EU’s most senior UK diplomat”.

I am pretty sure that if it was not Ashton, the media would write something about “Ashton shows leadership” or “a fresh start after weeks of bad publicity” or “spokesman quits after indiscreet leaks”.

Just to put it in context: Usually the media ignores resignations of spokespersons.

Three waves | Roll into port together | The trio is home. (Herman Van Rompuy)

What does this mean in practice, what are the advantages of the Trio and its relations with the newly established players? It might be too early to judge, but we can already get some insight from the experience of the Spanish-Belgian- Hungarian Trio. Its work has been reflected on at the launch of a report on the contribution of 14 European think-tanks to the Spanish, Belgian and Hungarian Trio Presidency of the European Union.

While, in the pre-Lisbon setting, the past, current and forthcoming Presidencies were encouraged to work together in order to ensure coherence and continuity, the fact that now this collaboration is made official (and compulsory), gives it a boost, by creating common practices. The civil servants from the three countries meet regularly, in sectoral structures and at various levels, to discuss the priorities for the 18 months. This starts about two years before the first Presidency takes office and ends after the third has finished its mandate, not before making a thorough evaluation of the Trio’ s performance. All this may sound like  a normal bureaucratic procedure, a pure coordination task. Yet, it is more than that. It is an exercise that helps civil servants  and politicians with different (sometimes very different) administrative and political cultures to get to know and understand each other and start thinking out of the “national” box. Thus, in order to draft a common programme, the three countries try to take on board each other’s interests, apart from their own national one, leading to a set of priorities that each of them can feel the ownership of. Moreover, these priorities that have been agreed by three Member States have a bigger weight when it comes to defining each country’s own strategic lines for he 6 months period.

The protagonists of the first official trio, Spain, Belgium and Hungary, seem to have found this exercise very useful. At the symbolic level, they decided to use the same logo design, with only the colours of the national flags changing. A common website was also created (www.eutrio.eu); however, contrary to expectations, this web address is currently used just as an alias for the Spanish Presidency website (which, in its turn, does not have a lot of references to the Trio and not in the most visible of places). At the more practical level, the Trio has drafted a single programme, instead of three different programmes as it used to be the case; however, it seems that each country still follows its own set of priorities, de facto reducing the common programme to a strategic framework, while still allowing specific Member States to take credit for certain achievements that happened to take place in their 6 months term. (Update: the Spanish Presidency is already “taking stock” of the achievements of the first third of its term, coming up with a very positive assessment. No reference to the common Trio programme and the progress in terms of that, in case you were wondering).

During the preparatory stage, the Trio had some daring ideas, such as having one country chairing one working group or/and Council formation for 18 months, while the other two countries chair others, or to have interchangeable chairs from the three countries. These arrangements would have reinforced the idea of a common programme and a common identity; but they proved to be too forward-thinking for this moment, adding up to the current post-Lisbon institutional confusion. Perhaps this is still something to think about for the next Trio (Poland, Denmark and Cyprus).

It still remains to be seen what role the rotating Presidency will carve for itself in the new interinstitutional power balance. Even though most of the visibility is taken up by Herman Van Rompuy, one has to remember that it is still the rotating Presidency that chairs the 270 Council Working Groups, the COREPER meetings, as well as nine out of ten Council formations, including the General Affairs Council (GAC), whose horizontal coordination role can prove to be very important strategically. Another key issue is how the Trio Presidencies will relate to the newly established institution- the European Council- and its growing powers, especially in the economic area. While the usual working practices of the Council are of a bottom-up nature (starting at Working Group level, then going to COREPER and only then- and only the controversial, unsolved issues- going to the level of Ministers), the increased role of the European Council might see these practices change, allowing for the possibility of a top-down approach in certain areas.

Irrespective of the way the Trio will interpret and fulfill its tasks, it is important to remember, when looking at the institutional structure of post-Lisbon EU, that the rotating Presidency is still playing an important role. Practice will show, in the following months, if the idea of an official Trio has given it more strength, coherence and continuity. And all this beyond a common logo and a programmatic set of common priorities.

There has been a big debate about the SWIFT affair in the last weeks. But, looking into the file in more detail, something else than the often discussed content got my attention: the code of the procedure: NLE/2009/0190. A quick research led me to the full name of the procedure: Interinstitutional non-legislative procedure. For those who (for one reason or another) are interested in knowing what this procedure covers and cannot figure it out from the large list of documents labeled post-Lisbon with the NLE code, I am afraid I don’t have good news. The new code covers all the procedures where the European Parliament is involved but which do not fall under the new ordinary legislative procedure (formerly known as co-decision) or the special legislative procedures (the old consultation and assent).

Quite broad, right? Well, some refining will be on the agenda of the institutions, threatening to keep some people busy for at least a few months until all the innovations and their implications have been spelled out at the practical level.

I think it is a very good initiative. There are a lot of opportunities for EU institutions by engaging with web tools. Unfortunately there is still a rather widespread skepticism among politicians and officials despite a few good examples how to use web 2.0 tools successfully. Hopefully this letter will contribute to a rethink in the institutions. Moreover, this would also be a good topic to bring up during the Commission-designate hearings in the European Parliament this week…

Hat tip:  Dick Nieuwenhuis Blog: Please, use web 2.0 for Europe!

1. The Commission shall promote the general interest of the Union and take appropriate initiatives to that end. [...]
3. (…) The members of the Commission shall be chosen on the ground of their general competence and European commitment from persons whose independence is beyond doubt. In carrying out its responsibilities, the Commission shall be completely independent. Without prejudice to Article 18(2), the members of the Commission shall neither seek nor take instructions from any Government or other institution, body, office or entity. They shall refrain from any action incompatible with their duties or the performance of their tasks.

Article 17, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union

Let’s start with the good news: The appointment of two nobodies to the EU top jobs is a good argument if you want to discuss with ‘Euroskeptics’ about the existence of a “EU superstate” – even they might agree that Van Rompuy and Ashton are weak politicians that are not likely not raise the EU profile. To all the journalists out there: It is also a good time to get your facts straight on the “real” powers of the European Council President. It is not the “President of the EU” and if you look up a few basic facts you might discover the explanation why Von Rompuy makes perfect sense (from the perspective of the European Council!).

Moreover, one could argue that issues will be more important than people. I don’t think the media will take any interest in the work of Baroness Ashton or Van Rompuy over the next couple of years which might help to define the job profiles properly and focus on issues. Both, Ashton and van Rompuy are not the most qualified or experienced people which can also be an advantage. Expectations are not very high so they can only surprise us …

Philosophically it is an expression of the soft power approach as both candidates appear as consensus builders that are able to organise majorities and get the deals done. Catherine Ashton already stressed her approach of “quiet diplomacy” which can be interpreted as a notion of  ‘structural foreign policy’. It’s clearly a continuation of the traditional EU approach which, after all, proved to be quite successful in the last decades (generally speaking – obviously not in foreign policy…). And hey, it could have been even worse…

Ok, so much for the “good” news (if you are a hardcore optimist…). The bad aspects of the choice are somewhat more convincing. There will be no inspired leadership, no innovative approaches, no inspiration, which is  not a surprise given the lack of any relevant experience of both politicians. The European Union Law blog digged out an interesting quote by Herman Van Rompuy who thinks that “every country should emerge victorious from negotiations”. and that the institutional debate in the EU “is closed for a long period”. Plus, Van Rompuy is not a fan of Turkish EU accession.

Another interesting question is how did we end up with these two uninspiring candidates? Baroness Ashton is a real surprise, nobody thought of her as the new High Rep. Van Rompuy has been mentioned by the press for quite a while now. If you include Buzek, the president of the European parliament, into the equation it makes perfect sense as it shows an almost perfect representation with most formal boxes being ticked: East/West, North/South, small/large, a woman, left/right, … It strikes me that this kind of thinking does not produce the best results.

Especially the Socialists are to blame again. After failing to propose a own candidate for European Commission president earlier this year they now managed to get the High Rep position which was initially a smart political move. But then again Ashton seems to represents the lowest common denominator of the Socialists. They could have proposed a more qualified candidate – maybe even from another party! But it is fair to say that many potential candidates still prefer national instead of European careers.

Baroness Ashton is a solid and decent Commissioner but she does not have any foreign policy experience. It will be interesting to see whether she will actually be comfortable to interpret the new “double hatted” role which will be a quite demanding job! And Von Rompoy will keep a low profile:

As has been my custom in Belgian politics, I will remain discreet in the media, certainly during the forthcoming weeks.

So, do not expect anything spectacular from him! (Anyway, the ‘president’ post has always been hyped by the media – it is a chairman, nothing more nothing less! Frankly I don’t care too much about this president. Actually I think a strong personality would have caused more problems given the lack of proper ‘presidential’ powers!)

There won’t be a personalisation of EU politics which means that intergovernmental bargaining will become even more central to decision making. It seems that the French-German alliance is running the show again. At the moment, national governments think that it is not in their interest to have strong personalities at the EU level. Just think about Barroso, Ashton, Buzek, Van Rompuy…

Oh yes, and it is quite likely that nobody outside the Eurobubble will notice that the Lisbon treaty is in place…

Richard Whitman at Monnet musings highlights the external dimension of the decision:

What will outsiders make of these choices? In Beijing, Moscow and Washington policy-makers and analysts will be hard pressed to discern anything from these appointments. Neither seems to signal any clear intent for a new direction and character for the EU or the future direction of its foreign policy.

But will the Commission benefit from all that? I am not sure. Barroso is rather weak and uninspired. Much will depend on the new College of Commissioners. One thing is clear: The Commission president will remain the most known EU politician. Van Rompuy or Ashton are not likely to challenge this because they seem to be even weaker than Barroso.

We got the people that we deserve. It is the perfect recipe for uninspired continuity, boredom and status quo. Exactly what the EU needs!

So who is Günther Oettinger? He is Ministerpräsident (CDU) of Baden-Württemberg and a somewhat diffult ally of Angela Merkel (he often criticized her as he wanted to “sharpen his profile in Berlin”, there are also rumours of him being part of the Anti-Merkel Andenpakt).

Officially he was chosen because of his expertise in economic affairs which is a clear signal of Merkel that he should get a prominent single market related portfolio in the next Commission. One could also come to the conclusion that Merkel wanted to get rid of him… Although I do not think he would have been a serious problem for Merkel… he has become quite unpopular in BW and is perceived as a pretty weak  Ministerpräsident! – so it is rather a good exit strategy for him!

I think Chancellor Merkel could have picked a better candidate! Oettinger is a local politician – he  has never had a position on the national level. His career is focused on Baden-Württemberg only – admittedly one of the best performers among the German Länder. However, the economic crisis has had a huge impact and Oettinger was heavily criticized about his abilities to manage the crisis.  And he totally lacks any European or international experience and I don’t know anything about his language skills. Actually he is much more a bureaucrat than a politician which again might be helpful in the Commission.

If you are interested in Günther Oettingers EU credentials you might want to check the Baden Württemberg – EU website here. Unfortunately he is not the best public speaker, so he won’t be a Commissioner that will engage actively with the public and make the case for EU policy. However, chancellor Merkel will make sure that  the EU commission will not act against the German government and she also underlines her role in EU politics – and ultimately that of the European Council and her direct connection to Barosso – without the interference of a German commissioner.

Günther Oettinger stands for the status quo – ‘no experiments’ plus solid bureaucratic work. Unfortunately that might also be an indicator for the EU attitude of the new German government. So I doubt whether we will see important German EU initiatives in the next years.

A notable scandal included Günther Oettinger defending Hans Filbinger Nazi past. The “eulogy controversy” sparked quite a debate within Germany. Some in Brussels might remember this photo which was taken during a party (in Brussels) in which Oettinger obviously had a good time:

Afterwards he said he was behaving normally and he does not intend to change. He actually had a couple of scandals involving a lot of beer and right wing songs… so watch out Brussels!

I actually come from the same region (even same city!) as Oettinger  so I have followed his career in the last years…so I might write some more about him in the future. Generally, I think people in the region will be quite happy to get rid of him. He is known to be a fast talker which often makes it very hard to understand him (even if you are a German native speaker – and even if you speak a dialect called Swabian!) One example:

The video is about Frontex and how the EU in general deals with the problem of so called “illegal immigrants”, often refugees from Africa,  that try to reach Europe by crossing the Mediterranean Sea. There are claims that many refugees die as a result of Frontex activity. Border guards regularly catch people in small boats trying to reach Europe. There seems to be evidence that border guards force these people to return to their countries in those small boats and without enough food, water, equipment.  This practice  is not  allowed under the European Convention on Human Rights which obviously contradicts all the talk of Europe being at the forefront of defending human rights…

Moreover, the video also mentions  that Frontex and EDA are likely to use  more sophisticated military equipment in the fight against immigrants in the future. This poses the question whether the EU actually  ‘militarises’ its  external borders and whether that is a desirable outcome…

The categories:

First, the president should be, well, boring — like Brussels itself. Politicians have knocked down candidates for being too controversial or too outspoken. Second, he should likely hold center-right or Christian Democratic political tendencies, given that Europe itself is headed that direction. Third, he should come from a country that uses the euro — showing full fealty to the concept of the union. Fourth, he should come from a small European country — anything other than Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, which normally dominate the union’s affairs. Finally, two wild-card characteristics: He should ideally speak French and have opposed the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq — if not at the time, then soon afterward.

Read the article (with more less detailed profiles of each candidate) here. Obviously the list is debatable: For example, it seems strange to include Angela Merkel (not boring?) and Anders Fogh Rasmussen but not Mary Robinson… also candidates from the Iberian peninsula might might not be considered since Commission President Barroso is from Portugal, to a lesser extent that might also be true for Polish candidates (Buzek = President of the European Parliament). I was also wondering about the language skills of the contenders… (Most of them fluent in French? – And what about English ?). One important category is missing: The “I made the case for the EU while being in office” – category.
Oh, and  sadly even the analysts (in this case: “assistant editor with a degree from Harvard”) of Foreign Policy fall into the trap of talking about a “EU President”…

1. There is a difference between the European Council, the Council of the EU and the Council of Europe – just look it up! Try to get your facts straight about the rotating presidency and EU terminology in general.

2. The Polish and  Czech parliaments approved the Lisbon treaty already! Only 2 signatures are missing.  So, please don’t write that both countries  still need to vote on the treaty…

3. And while we are at it: Do your research on the competences of the Czech president (hint: Czech constitution, some basics on parliamentary vs. presidential systems)

4. There is no actual link between the Irish Yes and a European Council President Blair – The treaty merely creates the position of a European Council President and not, I repeat: NOT: EU president, President of Europe etc.) Actually, the position is more like a permanent chairman… Tony Blair seems to be one of the people that are interested in getting the job. So try to get hold of other nominees as well! If you write a opinion piece you might want to check the issue of open nominations and the stopblair petition (more arguments against Blair here).

5. Anyway, forget about the “European Council president” for a moment.  It is much more important who will be nominated for the new Commission. And who will be the next High Representative for Foreign Affairs. All of these jobs are actually more powerful than the European Council president.

Thank you!

I am pretty sure that the  pressure on Klaus will be enormous. There are already rumors that Angela Merkel is preparing a “diplomatic sweetener” for him, whatever that means… Taking into account that the Czech Parliament ratified the treaty and the Czech president does not have any powers to veto the treaty,  it is his constitutional obligation to sign it eventually (apparently the problem is that the Czech constitution does not specify how long the President is allowed to postpone his  signature). Obviously he will use the argument that he needs to wait until the constitutional court has issued the ruling on a complaint of some senators. But in the end I am pretty sure that he will sign and that he will not have the guts to wait until the Conservatives form a government in the UK (which might happen next summer)…

However, the wider context is noteworthy: After a almost a decade of debate (Laeken 2001, Convention, Constitutional treaty, …) it seems that we end up with this mini reform treaty. I think most of the other major EU treaties contained more far-reaching reforms than this one. Basically only a couple of things are really innovative:  new double majority voting in more policy areas, a strengthened role for the European Parliament, some clarifications regarding competences, and some improvements in the field of EU foreign policy.

One thing is quite clear, there won’t be another big EU treaty for the foreseeable future  given the difficulty to get such a text ratified by 27 member states. A positive side effect might be that we can finally concentrate on policy issues and leave this institutional debate behind us – at least for a couple of years.  However, the Lisbon Treaty is far from being perfect and it is quite possible that it will create a number of institutional problems. The future will bring new challenges and new reforms might be necessary. And let’s face it: every reform needs to be reformed. So how is it possible to address these challenges and ensure further EU reform, even with 30+ member states (and with people like David Cameron)?

One possibility is to move towards thematic treaties. For example a “issue treaty” on climate change, or one on foreign policy or on police cooperation. These treaties would address one specific issue only – which seems much easier to communicate. These treaties would contain a list of competences for EU institutions as well as national institutions. Moreover, such an issue treaty would address the decision making in this specific policy area and  maybe even include  specific policy aims (reducing emission by 30%, creating a new agency or a new position, banning a certain chemical substance,  introducing a certain measure…whatever). One thing must be included however: if a country rejects one of those treaties, everyone must be clear about the consequences. Basically, a rejection would result in an opt out (similar to Schengen, Euro) but with the possibility to join later.  Of course the result would be an even more complex EU. But maybe this is the price to pay for a bigger and more diverse EU…